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J URISDIC I ION OF I HESUPR EME COUR I
The Utah Supreme Cour •
§78-2-2(3)Q)(2002)(appeal from final judgment).
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSLL I
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Re\ ised Limited Liability Act by summarily confirming an arbitrator's award expellii ig both
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pellants as members—and removing Appellant Duke as manager—of a limited liability
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ISSUE II. Did the trial court violate tin1 Di le Process and Oprn I 'onrls t "hmi^ ni'Hi I Ifjli,
Constitution by summarily confirming an arbitrator's award expelling both A p ^ w u t s as
members-and removing .Appellant Duke as manager—of a limited liability company,, even
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determination about whether such sanction ; h«
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or an independent judicial
l

4,11. 14-17, p. 184)
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. No deference is afforded to the district
court's legal conclusions. Grynberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ^f 23. 70 P.3d 1
(matter of law reviewed for correctness); Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913,914-915 (Utah
1998)(correctness standard).
ISSUE III. Did the trial court err by confirming the arbitrator's award herein, even though
the arbitrator made no findings to support such award and thereby failed to "make a record'1
as required by Section 78-3 la-120 of the Utah Arbitration Act?
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. No deference is afforded to the district
court's legal conclusions. Grynberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ^ 23, 70 P.3d 1
(matter of law reviewed for correctness); Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 914-915 (Utah
1998)(correctness standard).
ISSUE IV. Did the trial court err by refusing to award Appellants their attorney fees, costs
and interest as required by Section 78-3 la-126(3) of the Utah Arbitration Act?
Standard of Review: The proper interpretation and application of a statute is a
question of law which is reviewed for correctness. No deference is afforded to the district
court's legal conclusions. Grynberg v. Ouestar Pipeline Co., 2003 UT 8, ^f 23, 70 P.3d 1
(matter of law reviewed for correctness); Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913,914-915 (Utah
1998)(correctness standard).
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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL
ai (. I, § ?. |l)iic process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.

UTAH CONST,

1 h AII CONST, art. 1,fcII. |( 'ourts open - Redress of injuries.]
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him in his person,
property or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, which shall be
administered without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred from
prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this State, by himself or counsel any
civil cans'rich he is a part)
art. VIII, § 1. [Judicial powers — Courts J
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a u mi * ourt of
general jurisdiction known as the district court, and such other courts as the
Legislature by statute may establish. The Supreme Court, the district court, and such
other courts designated by statute shall be courts of record. Courts not ,-x -*\ V*1 shall
also be established by statute.

UTAH CONST,

Expulsion of a member.
A member of a company may be expelled:
(1) as provided in the company's operating agreement:
(2) by unanimous vote of the other members if it is
umpany's
business with the member; or
n ) on application by the company or another member h\ judicial dcicmiiiiaiiun mat the
UTAH CODE § 4 8 - 2 C - 7 1 0

(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially affected the company's
business;
(b) has willfully oi persistemi)
oi aie articles of organization
r
or operating agreement or ^ - * the other members under
Section 48-2c-807; or
<c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business wi • -h. makes it nol irnsonablv
ticable to earn on the business with the member.

*

- u.
•' •

coiin

«;c-809. Removal by judicial proceeding.
of the county in this state where a company's designated office is
>o designated office in this state, its registered office is located, may
fa manager-managed company in a proceeding commenced either h\
nembers holding at least 25% of the interests in profits ofth * ^-^p-? :
at:
engaged in fniu Juknl or dishonest conduct or JTOSS abuse of authority or
3

discretion with respect to the company; and
(b) removal is in the best interests of the company.
(2) The court that removes a manager may bar the manager from reelection for a period
prescribed by the court.
(3) If members commence a proceeding under Subsection (1) above, they shall make the
company a party defendant.
(4) Subsections (1), (2), and (3) shall also apply to enable the removal of a member in a
member-managed company from having any management authority or powers on behalf of
the company.
(5) If the court orders removal of a manager or member under this section, the clerk of the
court shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the division for filing.
§ 78-31a-120. Award.
(1) An arbitrator shall make a record of an award. The record must be signed or otherwise
authenticated by any arbitrator who concurs with the award. The arbitrator or the arbitration
organization shall give notice of the award, including a copy of the award, to each party to
the arbitration proceeding.
(2) An award must be made within the time specified by the agreement to arbitrate or, if not
specified in the agreement, within the time ordered by the court. The court may extend or the
parties to the arbitration proceeding may agree on the record to exlend the time. The court
or the parties may do so within or after the time specified or ordered. A party waives any
objection that an award was not timely made unless the party gives notice of the objection
to the arbitrator before receiving notice of the award.
UTAH CODE

§ 78-31a-124. Vacating an award.
(1) Upon motion to the court by a party to an arbitration proceeding, the court shall vacate
an award made in the arbitration proceeding if:
(a) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means;
(b) there was:
(i) evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral arbitrator;
(ii) corruption by an arbitrator; or
(iii) misconduct by an arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(c) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon showing of sufficient cause for
postponement, refused to consider evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise
conducted the hearing contrary to Section 78-3 la- 116, so as to substantially prejudice the
rights of a party to the arbitration proceeding;
(d) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrators authority;
(e) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the person participated in the arbitration
proceeding without raising an objection under Subsection 78-3 la-116(3) not later than the
beginning of the arbitration hearing; or
(f) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice of the initiation of an arbitration as
required in Section 78-3 la-110 so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party to the
UTAH CODE

4

arbitration proceeding.
(2) A motion under this section must be filed within 90 days after the movant receives notice
of the award pursuant to Section 78-3 la-120 or within 90 days after the movant receives
notice of a modified or corrected award pursuant to Section 78-3 la-121, unless the movant
alleges that the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means, in which
case the motion must be made within 90 days after the ground is known or by the exercise
of reasonable care would have been known by the movant.
(3) If the court vacates an award on a ground other than that set forth in Subsection (l)(e),
it may order a rehearing. If the award is vacated on a ground stated in Subsection (l)(a) or
(b), the rehearing must be before a new arbitrator. If the award is vacated on a ground stated
in Subsection (l)(c), (d), or (f), the rehearing may be before the arbitrator who made the
award or the arbitrator's successor. The arbitrator must render the decision in the rehearing
within the same time as that provided in Subsection 78-3 la-120(2) for an award.
(4) If the court denies a motion to vacate an award, it shall confirm the award unless a motion
to modify or correct the award is pending.
UTAH CODE

§ 78-31a-126. Judgment on award — Attorney's fees and litigation

expenses.
(1) Upon granting an order confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying,
or correcting an award, the court shall enter a judgment conforming to the award. The
judgment may be recorded, docketed, and enforced as any other judgment in a civil action.
(2) A court may allow reasonable costs of the motion and subsequent judicial proceedings.
(3) On application of a prevailing party to a contested judicial proceeding under Section 783 la-123,78-3 la-124, or 78-3 la-125, the court may add reasonable attorneys fees and other
reasonable expenses of litigation incurred in a judicial proceeding after the award is made
to a judgment confirming, vacating without directing a rehearing, modifying, or correcting
an award.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case, course of proceedings, disposition in court below
An arbitrator unlawfully expelled Appellants Duke and Cardenas as members of their
limited liability company, and also removed Appellant Duke as a manager of the company.
Such action destroyed Appellants' property rights in membership and management of their
company.
The arbitrator's action was unlawful because he "exceeded... [his]... authority" under
Section 78-31a-124(l)(d) of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act because the Utah Revised
Limited Liability Company Act expressly provides that only a court, through an independent
judicial determination, can expel a member or remove a manager. UTAH CODE § 48-2c710(3)("judicial determination" required to expel a member); UTAH CODE § 48-2c-809 (only
a "court" may remove a manager). The arbitrator also failed to "make a record" as required
by 78-3 la-120(l) of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act.
The trial court simply rubber-stamped the arbitrator's award, without making an
independent judicial determination. The trial court thereby violated both Appellants' rights
to a "judicial determination," as required by Section 48-2c-710(3) of the Utah Revised
Limited Liability Company Act for expelling a member, as well as Appellant Dukefs right
to have a "court" determine whether he should have been removed as a manager under Utah
Code Section 48-2c-809.
The trial court's failure to make an independent judicial determination also violated
Appellants1 rights to their "day in court" under the Due Process and Open Courts provisions

6

of the Utah Constitution.
In addition, the trial court's summary upholding of the arbitrator's award violated
Section 78-3 la-120(1) of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act because the arbitrator failed to
"make a record" as required by that section. And by refusing to award Appellants their
attorney fees, costs and interest, the trial court also violated Section 78-3 la-126 of the Utah
Uniform Arbitration Act.
This Court therefore should reverse the trial court, vacate the arbitrator's award, grant
Appellants their attorney fees, costs and interest at trial and on appeal, and order the trial
court to issue such other orders as will compensate Appellants for harms resulting from the
arbitrator's unlawful award.
Statement of Facts
1. On July 18,2003, Appellants and Appellees executed an "Amended and Restated
Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC" (hereinafter "Operating Agreement").
(R. 225-43; Addendum Exh. 1)
2. The parties named their company "Way Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC" (hereinafter
"WCDC"). (R. 227; Addendum Exh. 1, § 2.2, p.3)
3. The Operating Agreement provides for the following contributions and percentage
ownership of the parties:
Party
Appellant Duke
Appellant Carmen
Appellee RGraham
Appellee DGraham

Contribution
$ 150,000
$ 100
$75,000
$60,000
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Percentage Interest
45%
10%
30%
15%

(R. 227, 243; Addendum Exh. 1, pp. 3, 19)
4. Appellant Duke and Appellee RGraham are designated as the managers of
WCDC). (R. 228; Addendum Exh. 1, §3.1(c), p.4)
5. Such managers may removed"... by Members holding two thirds of the Percentage
Interests, held by Members, acting by written consent or at a meeting of the Members." (R.
229; Addendum Exh. 1, §3.3(b), p.5)
6. WCDC is designated as "... a limited liability company formed under the [Utah
Revised Limited Liability Company Act]... ." (R. 225; Addendum Exh. 1, p. 1, Recital,
11.1(a))
7. Resolution of inconsistencies between the Operating Agreement and the Utah
Revised Limited Liability Company Act is provided for as follows:
"If there are inconsistencies between this Agreement and the Act, this Agreement will
control, except to the extent the inconsistencies relate to provisions of the Act that
the Company cannot alter by agreement."
(R. 238-39; Addendum Exh. 1, §7.3, pp. 14-15)(Emphasis added)
8. With respect to resolution of disputes by arbitration, the Operating Agreement
provides:
"The arbitration procedure shall be governed by the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§1-16, and the award rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and binding on
the parties and may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."
(R. 240-41; Addendum Exh. 1, 8.3(a), pp. 16-17)(Emphasis added)
9. Enforcement of an arbitration award, however, is further provided for as follows:
"Any legal proceeding to enforce an arbitration award hereunder may be brought
in a court of competent jurisdiction (either state or federal) in Salt Lake County,
8

Utah."
(R. 241; Addendum Exh. 1, p. 17,1f8.4)(Emphasis added)
10. A dispute arose between Appellants and Appellees regarding WCDC, and by
order dated February 23,2005, the trial court ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute. (R.
138, at 143)
11. On Thursday, August 11, 2005, Arbitrator Kent B. Scott issued an award which
(a) expelled both appellants Duke and Cardenas as members of WCDC and (b) removed
Appellant Duke as manager of WCDC. (R. 266, 271; Addendum Exh. 2, (Award-Tfl, p.l;

V, p.6))
12. The arbitrator based the expulsion of Appellants as members from WCDC on
Utah Code §§ 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (c). (R. 266; Addendum Exh. 2, (AwarcHfl, p.l))
13. The arbitrator made no findings, but only provided "Comments'1 as the foundation
for his award, and expressly stated that:
"•.J am providing the following comments in connection with the Award. The
comments are not to be construed or taken to be findings of fact or conclusions
of law."
(R. 268; Addendum Exh. 2, (Award- p.3))(Emphasis added)
14. On October 14,2005, the trial court below entered a two-page "Order Confirming
Arbitration Award," summarily providing:
"The Award issued by arbitrator Kent B. Scott on August 11, 2005 (the'Award') is
confirmed. A copy of the Award is attached as Exhibit fAf and incorporated by this
reference."
(R. 263-64; Addendum Exh. 2, (Order~1[l, pp. 1-2))
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15. Also on October 14, 2005, the trial court below issued a "Judgement [sic]
Conforming to Arbitration Award" summarily providing:
"The Court granted Randal and David Graham's Motion for Order Confirming
Arbitration Award and for Judgment Conforming to the Award. For the reasons set
forth in the in the [sic] Award of Arbitrator Kent B. Scott dated August 11,2005 (the
'Award'), the court enters judgment as follows:"
(R. 274; Addendum Exh. 3, p.l)
16. The trial court acknowledged that its "Judgement":
"...copied everything verbatim, including nothing more, and leaving out nothing,
than is set forth in the award, other than the beginning statements and the concluding
signatures."
(R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11.8-11, p.l93)(Emphasis added)
17. The trial court emphasized that its "Judgement":
"...[did not do] anything different from signing the confirmation order...."
(R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 1.4, p. 194)
18. Appellant's counsel pointed out to the trial court that "the law of the state of Utah
is that you cannot either expel a member or expel a manager of a limited liabilily company
except by judicial proceedings." (R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 14-17, p.184)
19. In response, the trial court stated that it considered the arbitrator's award to be "...a
judicial determination." (R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 14-15, p.187)
20. The trial court apparently labored under the impression that the arbitrator was free
to disregard applicable law:
"THE COURT: So your position is, even if Arbitrator Scott made a mistake as to the
law, that doesn't matter.
"MR. WILLIAMS: That's right."
10

(R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 2-5, p. 176)
21. In summary, the trial court concluded:
"So, again, I would - I would find and rule as a matter of law that - that, in this
instance, with respect to the removal of members or managers, that the arbitrator did
not exceed his authority, that that was within his authority."
(R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 17-21, p.188)
22. The trial court made it crystal-clear that it was not making an independent
determination, but merely adopting the arbitrator's award:
"I think I've arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe 150
arbitration cases. I have served as an arbitrator also on a number of cases. And I feel
that it is a - it is a good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the award
of the arbitrator has such a potential finality. And in this instance, if s obvious that the
plaintiffs don't agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's their
prerogative. But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't be enforced under the law."
(R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 2-11, p.195)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
An arbitrator unlawfully expelled Appellants Duke and Cardenas as members of their
limited liability company, and also removed Appellant Duke as a manager of the company.
Such action destroyed Appellants' property rights in membership and management of their
company. The arbitrator exceeded his authority because only a court, through an independent
judicial determination, can expel a member or remove a manager from a limited liability
company. The arbitrator also failed to "make a record" as required by law.
The trial court summarily confirmed the arbitrator's award without conducting an
independent judicial determination, and even though the arbitrator had failed to make a
record. Moreover, the trial court denied Appellants their attorney fees, costs and interest.
11

The trial court's judgment should be reversed because the trial court thereby violated
both Appellants' rights to a "judicial determination," as required by Section 48-2c-710(3) of
the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act for expelling a member, as well as
Appellant Duke's right to have a "court" determine whether he should have been removed
as a manager under Utah Code Section 48-2c-809.
The trial court's failure to make an independent judicial determination also violated
Appellants' rights to their "day in court" under the Due Process and Open Courts provisions
of the Utah Constitution.
In addition, the trial court's summary upholding of the arbitrator's award violated
Section 78-31 a-120( 1) of the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act because the arbitrator had failed
to "make a record" as required by that section. And by refusing to award Appellants their
attorney fees, costs and interest, the trial court also violated Section 78-3 la-126 of the Utah
Uniform Arbitration Act.
This Court therefore should reverse the trial court, vacate the arbitrator's award, grant
Appellants their attorney fees, costs and interest at trial and on appeal, and order the trial
court to issue such other orders as will compensate Appellants for harms resulting from the
arbitrator's unlawful award.

12

ARGUMENT
L

The trial court violated Utah Code §§ 48-2c-710(3) and 48-2c-809 by confirming
the arbitrator's award without making an independent "judicial determination"
A. A judicial determination was required in order to expel Appellants Duke and
Cardenas as members of WCDC and to remove Appellant Duke as manager of
WCDC
The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act provides in relevant part that a

member of a company may be expelled:
"(3) on application by the company or another member, by judicial determination
that the member:
(a) has engaged in wrongful conduct that adversely and materially affected the
company's business;
. . . . or
(c) has engaged in conduct relating to the company's business which makes it
not reasonably practicable to carry on the business with the member."
UTAH CODE

§ 48-2c-710(3) (Emphasis added).

The arbitrator purported to expel Appellants as members from WCDC based on
Subsections (3)(a) and (c). (R. 266; Addendum Exh. 2, (Award--^1, p.l)) However,
Subsection (3) requires that a "judicial determination" must be made, finding one of the
grounds set out in the Subsection, before a member may be expelled from a limited liability
company.
The arbitrator cited no authority whatsoever for removing Appellant Duke as manager
of WCDC. (R. 271; Addendum Exh. 2, (Award--f7, p.6("...R. Gragam[sic] as the remaining
manager.")) With respect to removal of managers of limited liability companies, the Utah
Revised Limited Liability Company Act provides in relevant part:

13

"(1) The district court... may remove a manager ... in a proceeding ... if the court
finds that:
(a) the manager engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct or gross abuse of
authority or discretion with respect to the company; and
(b) removal is in the best interests of the company.
(2) The court that removes a manager may bar the manager from reelection for a
period prescribed by the court.
(5) If the court orders removal of a manager or member under this section, the clerk
of the court shall deliver a certified copy of the order to the division for filing.
UTAH CODE

§ 48-2c-809 (Emphasis added).

The Operating Agreement of the parties herein provides that managers may removed
"... by Members holding two thirds of the Percentage Interests, held by Members, acting by
written consent or at a meeting of the Members." (R. 229; Addendum Exh. 1, § 3.3(b), p.5)
No such procedure was used here, however, to remove Appellant Duke as manager of
WCDC.
Accordingly, Appellants Duke and Cardenas could only be removed as members of
WCDC by a "judicial determination" pursuant to Utah Code Section 48-2c-710(3), and
Appellant Duke could only be removed as manager of WCDC by a determination by a
"court" pursuant to Utah Code Section 48-2c-809.
B. A "judicial determination" under the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Company Act necessarily requires that a court, not an arbitrator, make the
determination
The Utah Constitution provides:
"The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court, in a trial court of
general jurisdiction known as the district court, and in such other courts as the
Legislature by statute may establish."
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UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 1. Accordingly, a "judicial determination" or "court" action to expel

a member or to remove a manager under the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act
necessarily requires that a court, and not an arbitrator, make such determinations.
Judicial determination is also compelled by the policies underlying the Utah Revised
Limited Liability Company Act. In CCD. L.C. v. Millsap. 2005 UT 42, 116 P.3d 366, this
Court held that the substantive bases for expulsion of members of limited liability companies
set out in the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act cannot be overridden by
provisions to the contrary in operating agreements. Moreover, the Court held, the judicial
procedures which that statute requires may not be overridden by operating agreements either:
"The requirement that expulsions be made by judicial determination affords
members ... [and managers], through the intervention of a neutral and impartial fact
finder, the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our
society."
CCD. L.C. v. Millsap. supra at \ 26(Emphasis added). Therefore, by its plain meaning, as
well as by its underlying policies, the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act demands
a determination by a court, not by an arbitrator, before a member may be expelled or a
manager may be removed. This is not surprising, since such actions utterly destroy the
property interests embodied in such positions.
C. The "judicial determination" required is an original judicial proceeding
The Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Actfs provisions for judicial
determinations for expelling a member or removing a manager command an originaljudicial
proceeding. The Operating Agreement here does not—and in fact could not--provide to the
contrary.
15

(1) The Operating Agreement did not waive the right to an independent
judicial determination
In their Operating Agreement, the parties agreed to arbitrate disputes "arising out of
or relating to" the Agreement...or any agreement or document in connection therewith...and
questions as to whether or not any dispute falls within the tenns o f their arbitration
agreement. (R. 240; Addendum Exh. 1, 8.3(a), p. 16) With respect to the procedure to be
used to arbitrate their disputes, the parties further agreed:
"The arbitration procedure shall be governed by the United States Arbitration Act, 9
U.S.C. §§1-16, and the award rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and binding on
the parties and may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof."
(R. 240-41; Addendum Exh. 1, 8.3(a), pp. 16-17) Although the parties thus purported to
make the arbitrator's award "final and binding," the parties further provided that such awards
required judicial enforcement as follows:
"Any legal proceeding to enforce an arbitration award hereunder may be brought in
a court of competent jurisdiction (either state or federal) in Salt Lake County, Utah."
(R. 241; Addendum Exh. 1, p. 17, ^8.4) Accordingly, the Operating Agreement of the parties
by its terms requires judicial action to enforce the award.
Such judicial action to enforce the award was required to be consistent with the Utah
Revised Limited Liability Company Act, since the Operating Agreement further provides:
"Ifthere are inconsistencies between this Agreement and the Act, this Agreement will
control, except to the extent the inconsistencies relate to provisions of the Act that the
Company cannot alter by agreement."
(R. 238-39; Addendum Exh. 1, §7.3, pp. 14-15) As discussed above, the Utah Revised
Limited Liability Company Act commands an independent judicial determination in order
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to expel a member, or to remove a manager. And the CCD, L.C. v. Millsap, 2005 UT 42, f
26,116 P.3d 366 stands for the proposition that an operating agreement cannot dispense with
such independent judicial proceedings.
The waiver of the right to an independent judicial determination can only be achieved
through a waiver "expressed in the most unequivocal terms." Lindon City v. Engineers Const.
Co., 636 P.2d 1070,1074 (Utah 1981). The parties' Operating Agreement is in no sense such
an "unequivocal" waiver. Accordingly, the parties' Operating Agreement did not preclude an
independent judicial determination.
(2) Even if the Operating Agreement precluded an independent judicial
determination, such provision would be unenforceable
Although the two statutes differ somewhat, under both the federal and Utah arbitration
acts, an arbitrator's award may be vacated on the ground that the arbitrator "exceeded" his
authority. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4)("where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was
not made"); UTAH CODE §§ 78-31a-124(l)(d)("an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's
authority").
An arbitrator "exceeds authority" by acting in "manifest disregard of the law." Pacific
Development L.C. v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, If 7,23 P.3d 1035 (action in "manifest disregard
of law" constitutes "exceeding authority"). An arbitrator acts in "manifest disregard of the
law" when "the error is obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the
average person qualified as an arbitrator" and "implies that the arbitrator appreciates the
existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore or pay no attention to
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it" Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers. Inc.. 925 P.2d 941, 951 (Utah 1996).
As discussed above, Utah Code Section 48-2c-710 (3), by its plain, express terms
provides for expulsion of members "by judicial determination." Equally clearly, Utah Code
Section 48-2c-809 provides that only a "court" may remove managers.
The "error" that the arbitrator committed here is that he took it upon himself to make
decisions that the Legislature has expressly reserved for "judicial determination" by a "court".
As this Court has emphasized, such provisions assure members and managers of limited
liability companies "the most reliable safeguard against inequitable treatment available in our
society," in order to adequately protect the substantial rights that membership and
management positions in a limited liability company confer. CCD. L.C. v. Millsap. supra at
126.
Accordingly, even if the parties' Operating Agreement precluded an independent
judicial determination, such provision would be unenforceable as contrary to the unequivocal
commands and policies of the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act.
II.

The trial court violated Appellants1 right to a "day in court" under the Utah
Constitution's Due Process and Open Courts provisions by confirming the
arbitrator's award without making an independent "judicial determination"
"That every person has a right to his day in court and an opportunity to be heard
before he can be deprived of a justiciable right is too elementary for discussion...."

Gitsch v.Wight 61 Utah 175,178-79,211 P. 705,706 (1922); Alder v. Baver Corp.. AGFA
Div., 2002 UT115, f 82,61 P.3d 1068 ("The right of supplicants to prove that which they are
able in court is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence.")
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Utah Constitution Article I, Section 7 prohibits deprivations of property without due
process and Article I, Section 11 secures the right of Utah residents to "open courts". UTAH
CONST,

art. I, § 7 (Due Process); UTAH CONST, art. I, § 11 (Open Courts). This Court has

emphasized that these clauses together embody the guarantee to a "day in court". Miller v.
USAA Cas. Ins. Co.. 2002 UT 6,1f66, 44 P.3d 663. In Miller, this Court held that a trial
court's order requiring resolution of certain non-contractual claims through non-judicial
appraisal, rather than through court litigation, deprived plaintiffs of their "day in court"
secured by both the Due Process and Open Courts clauses of the Utah Constitution.
Similarly, on October 15,2005, in a proceeding that lasted a mere 61 minutes, the trial
court below simply rubber-stamped the arbitrator's decision. (R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4,
pp. 156,195) The trial court signed off on a two-page "Order Confirming Arbitration Award"
which provided simply that "The Award issued by arbitrator Kent B. Scott on August 11,
2005 (the Award') is confirmed. R. 263-64; Addendum Exh. 2, f 1, pp. 1-2)
The trial court at the same proceeding also signed off on the "Judgement [sic]
Conforming to Arbitration Award" submitted by Appellees, which provided merely that
"The Court granted Randal and David Graham's Motion for Order Confirming
Arbitration Award and for Judgment Conforming to the Award. For the reasons set
forth in the in the [sic] Award of Arbitrator Kent B. Scott dated August 11,2005 (the
Award1), the court enters judgment...."
(R. 274; Addendum Exh. 3, p.l)
The "Judgement" simply "...copied everything verbatim, including nothing more, and
leaving out nothing, than is set forth in the award, other than the beginning statements and
the concluding signatures." (R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11.8-11, p.193) The trial court
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emphasized that its "Judgement" "...[did not do] anything different from signing the
confirmation order...." (R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 1.4, p. 194)
The trial court referred to the arbitrator's award as "...a judicial determination." (R.
371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 14-15, p. 187) The trial court concluded by emphasizing that it
was making no independent determination, but simply rubber-stamping the arbitrator's
award:
"I think I've arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe 150
arbitration cases. I have served as an arbitrator also on a number of cases. And I feel
that it is a — it is a good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the award
of the arbitrator has such a potential finality. And in this instance, it's obvious that the
plaintiffs don't agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's their
prerogative. But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't be enforced under the law."
(R. 371; Addendum Exh. 4, 11. 2-11, p.195)
The trial court thus failed to carry out the judicial function of hearing evidence,
resolving conflicts in that evidence, and applying the law to arrive at legal conclusions.
Appellants therefore were denied their "day in court" by the trial court in violation of
Appellants' constitutional rights under Utah's Due Process and Open Courts Clauses.
III.

The trial court erred by confirming the arbitrator's award herein, even though
the arbitrator made no findings to support such award and thereby failed to
"make a record" as required by Utah Code §78-31a-120
The Utah Arbitration Act provides that "An arbitrator shall make a record of an

award." UTAH CODE § 78-3 la-120(l). That Act further provides that an arbitrator's award
must be vacated for misconduct by the arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party or for
exceeding authority. UTAH CODE §§ 78-31a-124(l)(b)(iii)(prejudice to party), 78-3 la124(l)(d)(exceeding authority).
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This Court has held that "an arbitrator exceeds his or her delegated power if the
arbitration award has no foundation in reason or fact and is, therefore completely irrational"
or "utterly lacking in evidentiary support". Intermountain Power Agency v. Union Pacific
Railroad Company, 961 P.2d 320, 323 (Utah 1998). Moreover, this Court has made it clear
that if an arbitrator's award is "completely irrational," that is a separate and independent
ground for concluding that the arbitrator has exceeded his authority. Pacific Development
L.C. v. Orton. 2001 UT 36,%7 n.33, 23 P.3d 1035.
In this case, the arbitrator made no findings, but provided only "Comments" as the
foundation for his award:
"...I am providing the following comments in connection with the Award. The
comments are not to be construed or taken to be findings of fact or conclusions of
law."
(R. 268; Addendum Exh. 2, (Award-p.3)) Accordingly, the arbitrator thereby exceeded his
authority, and the trial court erred by summarily confirming the arbitrator's award.
IV.

The trial court erred by refusing to award Appellants their attorney fees, costs
and interest
The Utah Arbitration Act provides that
"On application of a prevailing party to a contested judicial proceeding under Section
78-3 la-123 [to confirm an award], the court may add reasonable attorney's fees and
other reasonable expenses of litigation incurred ...."

UTAH CODE

§ 78-31a-126(3). Since the trial court erroneously confirmed the award and

entered judgment thereon, the trial court erred by holding that Appellees were the prevailing
party. Since this Court should reverse the trial court, Appellants thereby will be the
"prevailing party" in the proceedings below. Since this issue will arise on remand, this court
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should address it. Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. Insure-Rite. Inc., 2001 UT App 347, TJ26, 37
P.3d 1202 (court has duty to pass on issues that may become material on remand).
Accordingly, this Court should order the trial court to award Appellants their attorney fees,
costs and interest pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-31 a-126(3), including their attorney fees,
costs and interest on appeal.
CONCLUSION
The trial court should be ordered to vacate the arbitrator's award and to issue such
orders as will compensate Appellants for harms resulting from the arbitrator's unlawful
award. The trial court also should be ordered to award Appellants their attorney fees, costs
and interest as the "prevailing party" in the proceedings below as well as on this appeal.
UTAH RULES APP. PROC.

34(a)(costs on appeal); Cooke v. Cooke, 2001 UT App 110, f 14,

22 P.3d 1249 (successful appellant entitled to costs on appeal).
DATED this 13th day of February, 2006.

y^HNMAftTOteZ
>J
/ ^ A t t o r n e y for Appellants /
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Exhibit 1:
Exhibit 2:
Exhibit 3:
Exhibit 4:

ADDENDUM
Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt Cheap,
LLC (R. 225-43)
Order Confirming Arbitration Award, October 14, 2005
(R. 263-73) (With Arbitrator's Award attached as R. 266-73)
Judgement [sic] Conforming to Arbitration Award, October 14, 2005
(R. 274-93)
Addendum Exh. 4, Transcript of trial court hearing, Friday, October 14,
2005 (R. 371)
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 1

AMENDED AND RESTATED
OPERATING AGREEMENT
OF
WAY COOL DIRT CHEAP, LLC
TfflS AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT (the "Agreement") is
executed as of July 18th, 2003 by and between RANDAL GRAHAM ("RGraham"), TED DUKE
("Duke"), David S. Graham ("DGraham"), and MARIA DEL CARMEN ZAVALA CARDENAS
("Carmen") (collectively the "Members") and WAY COOL DIRT CHEAP, LLC, a Utah limited
liability company (the "Company").
RECITAL
The Company is a limited liability company formed under the Act on April 15, 2003 with
RGraham and Duke as the sole Members. These Members also adopted an Operating Agreement
The parties intend by this Agreement to supersede, restate and confirm the rights and
obligations of the Members with respect to the Company's governance and financial affairs, to
adopt procedures for the conduct of the Company's activities, to admit DGraham and Carmen as
additional Members and to revise the Percentage Interests of the Members.
Accordingly, with the intention of being legally bound, the parties agree as follows:
ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS
1.1

Defined Terms. For purposes of this Agreement, unless the language or context

clearly indicates that a different meaning is intended, capitalized terms have the meanings specified
in this Article:
(a)

"Act" means the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act

(b)

"Agreement" means this agreement

(c)

"Articles" means the Articles of Organization, as amended to date, filed with

the Utah Division of Corporations and Commercial Code to organize the Company as a limited
liability company.
(d)

"Available Funds" means the Company's gross cash receipts, from its

operations or otherwise, less the sum of: (1) payments of principal, interest, charges and fees
pertaining to the Company's indebtedness; (2) expenditures incurred incident to the conduct of the
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Company's business; and (3) amounts reserved to meet the anticipated needs of the Company's
business.
(e)

"Capital Account" of a Member means the capital account maintained for

each Member and each Transferee in accordance with Article 4.
(f)

"Code" means the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.

(g)

"Contribution" means anything of value that a Member contributes to the

Company as a prerequisite for the acquisition of its Interest in the Company.
(h)

"Distribution" means the Company's direct or indirect transfer of money or

other property to a Member with respect to its Interest in the Company.
(i)

'^Effective Date," with respect to this Agreement, means the date set forth in

the opening paragraph hereof.
(j)

'Interest" or "Membership Interest" means the economic rights owned by a

Member or a Transferee.
(k)

"Manager" means a Person who is named or appointed to manage the

Company, in accordance with Article 3.
(I)

"Member" means a Person who has acquired and owns an Interest in the

Company and who is admitted as a Member.
(m)

"Minimum Gain" means minimum gain as defined in section 1.704 of the

(n)

"Percentage Interest" means the relative economic interest in the Company

Regulations.
owned by a Transferee or by a Member, evidencing such owner's share of profits, gains and losses
and the owner's share of the net assets of the Company that are distributable to the owner upon
dissolution of the Company.
(o)

"Person" means a natural person or an entity.

(p)

"Regulations" means proposed, temporary or final regulations promulgated

under the Code by the U.S. Treasury Department
(q)

"Terminating Event" means the death or disability of a Member (or a

Transferee) who is a natural Person or the dissolution or termination of a Member tliat is an entity.
A "Terminated Member" means a Member that is disabled, the estate of a Member that is deceased
or the successor of a Member that is dissolved.
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(r)

"Transfer," as a noun, means a transaction or event by which ownership of an

Interest is changed or encumbered, including a sale, exchange, abandonment, gift, pledge or
foreclosure. "Transfer," as a verb, means to effect a Transfer.
(s)

"Transferee" means a Person who acquires an Interest by a Transfer from a

Member or another Transferee but who is not admitted as a Member.
ARTICLE 2
THE COMPANY
2.1

Status. The Company is a Utah limited liability company organized under the Act

2.2

Name. The Company's name is Way Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC.
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Term. The Company's existence as a limited liability company will continue until

December 31,2033, unless sooner terminated under the Act or this Agreement
2.4

Principal Place of Business. The Company's principal place of business is located

at 768 West 1425 North, Layton, Utah 84041.
2.5

Registered Agent and Registered Office. The Company's registered office in Utah

is located at its principal place of business set forth in paragraph 2.4 above. Its registered agent at
that location is RGrahanL
ARTICLE 3
MEMBERS AND MANAGEMENT
3.1

Identification.
(a)

Members and Percentage Interests. The names and Percentage Interests of

the current Members are as follows:
Percentage
Name

(b)

Interests

Duke

45%

RGraham

30%

DGraham

15%

Carmen

10%

Contributions. The Contributions by the Members and their capital accounts

are set forth on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
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(c)
3.2

Managers. RGraham and Duke are the Managers of the Company.

Members Meetings and Voting.
(a)

Meetings, Meetings of the Members, for any purpose or purposes, may be

called by a Manager, or by Members holding one-fifth or more of all the Percentage Interests. The
meeting shall be held in Salt Lake County, Utah, at such location as is set forth in the notice calling
such meeting, or by conference telephone whereby each participant may be heard by each other
participant, unless all Members in attendance specify a different location. The notice shall also
specify the place, day and hour of the meeting and the purpose or purposes for which the meeting is
called. The written notice shall be delivered not less than ten nor more than thirty days before the
date of the meeting, either personally or by mail, to each Member of record, unless such notice is
waived by all Members or unless all Members are present at the meeting. If maikai, such notice
shall be deemed to be delivered when deposited in the United States mail, addressed to each
Member at its address as it appears on the records of the Company, with postage prepaid.
(b)

Voting; Quorum.
(i)

A Member may act through attendance at a meeting of Members or

through a Person authorized by a signed proxy. Members) whose aggregate Percentage Interests
exceed 75 percent (75%) of all Percentage Interests owned by Members will constitute a quorum at
a meeting of Members. No action may be taken in the absence of a quorum.
(ii)

Except with respect to matters for which a greater minimum vote is

required by the Act or this Agreement, the vote of Members whose aggregate Percentage Interests
exceeds 75 percent (75%) of all Percentage Interests owned by Members will constitute the act of
the Members at a meeting of Members.
(c)

Written Consent. The Members may act without a meeting by written

consent describing the action proposed to be taken and signed by Members whose aggregate
Percentage Interests are at least equal to the minimum that would be necessary to take the action at
a meeting at which all Members were present
33

Management of the Company.
(a)

General. The business and affairs of the Company shall be managed by the

two Managers who are identified in paragraph 3.1(c). The Managers shall make all decisions
affecting the management, operation $nd control of the Company, except for instances in which a
vote of a specified number of the Members is required hereby or by a provision of the Act
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Members holding 75 percent (75%) of the Percentage Interests owned by Members may amend this
paragraph to change the number of Managers. If there should be more than two Managers, the
decision of a majority of all Managers shall be the decision of the Company.
(b)

Vacancies. Any vacancy occurring in the position of Manager may be filled

by the Members, either at a meeting of Members at which a quorum is present, or pursuant to a
written consent adopted pursuant to this Agreement Any Manager may also be removed, with or
without cause, by Members holding two thirds of the Percentage Interests, held by Members, acting
by written consent or at a meeting of Members. Any Manager may resign at any time; such
resignation shall be in writing and shall take effect at the time specified in the notice of resignation,
or if no time is specified, at the time of its receipt by another Manager or Member.
(c)

Tax Matters Partners. RGraham shall act as the initial 'tax matters partner,"

for all tax matters in accordance with appropriate Regulations, and shall be authorized to litigate,
negotiate and resolve tax matters on behalf of the Company. The tax matters partner may make any
tax elections for the Company allowed under the Code, or the tax laws of any state, country, county
or other jurisdiction having taxing authority over the Company. The tax matters partner shall serve
as such at the discretion of the Members.
3.4

Transfers of Interest
(a)

Restrictions on Transfer. Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, no

Member may Transfer all or any part of its Interest without the prior written consent of each
Manager or of Members holding 75 percent (75%) of all outstanding Percentage Interests.
(b)

Profit-Loss Allocation. If any or all of a Member's Interests are Transferred,

there shall be allocated to the successor, afractionof the profits and losses for the taxable year of
the Company in which such disposition occurs, the numerator of suchfractionbeing the number of
days in such year that it was the owner of such Percentage Interests or such part thereof and the
denominator of suchfractionbeing the number of days in such taxable year. Any predecessor or
successor of such Member in respect of such Percentage Interests or part thereof shall share in
profits and be charged with such losses for the balance of the taxable year.
(c)

Involuntary Transfers. Whenever any owner of an Interest has any notice or

knowledge of any attempted, pending or consummated involuntary Transfer of or lien or charge
upon any Interest, whether by operation of law or otherwise, he or she shall give immediate notice
of that Transfer, lien or charge, and shall disclose to the Company all pertinent information in its
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possession relating to such transfer, lien or charge. The Company (or its designee) shall have the
continuing option to purchase such Interest, for a period of ninety (90) days, upon five days advance
written notice by the Company (or its designee) to the Member or other record holder of the Interest
for the Purchase Price determined as set forth in paragraph 3.5(b), and any such purchase shall be
free and clear of any and all liens, charges and encumbrances. The purchase price for any Interests
acquired by the Company (or its designee) pursuant to this provision shall be paid (at the option of
the purchaser) either in cash or through the delivery of a promissory note payable in 20 equal
quarter-annual installments of principal and interest (at 6% per annum) from the date of purchase,
with thefirstsuch installment due 180 days after such purchase.
(d)

Transferee Not a Member, If a Member attempts to transfer its rights as a

Member, but does not satisfy all of the provisions of this paragraph 3.4, then the Transferee shall
not become a Member in the Company and will have norightto vote or otherwise pzirticipate in the
business or affairs of the Company. Such Transferee shall be entitled only to receive the share of
profits or other compensation to which it would have been entitled as a Member holding the
economic interest that its predecessor conveyed to it.
(e)

First Offer Rights, (i) If any Member (the "Selling Member5') shall determine

to Transfer any or all of its Membership Interest in exchange for valuable consideration, the Selling
Member shall give notice thereof to each other Member stating the suggested price for the purchase,
and, if there is an interested purchaser who is not a Member, the identity of such purchaser and all
of the terms of such proposed purchase. Except as provided in clause (ii) of this subparagraph
3.4(e), within 45 days after receipt of such notice, the other Members may by notice to the Selling
Member elect to purchase such Membership Interest for the price offered by the Selling Member,
payable in accordance with the terms proposed by the Selling Member. If more than one other
Member chooses to purchase the Membership Interest, they may do so pro rata in proportion to the
Percentage Interests held by each such Member. The Selling Member shall notify the purchasing
Members of the time and date for consummation of the purchase, which shall be not less than 7
days nor more than 60 days after giving notice of purchase to the other Members. Upon receipt of
such notice by the other Members, they shall be obligated to purchase such Membership Interest
and the Selling Member shall be obligated to sell the same in accordance with the terms hereof.
The closing of a purchase and sale of a Membership Interest pursuant to this paragraph 3.4(e) shall
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be held at the principal office of the Company, at the date and time specified in the notice of
exercise.
(ii)

The preceding subparagraph notwithstanding, if there should occur a

Terminating Event with respect to Duke, and RGraham continues to be a Member of the Company,
then RGraham shall have therightto purchase from Duke's heirs or other successors an additional
Percentage Interest in the Company sufficient that RGraham will have a Percentage Interest of 51%,
or Duke's entire Percentage Interest if his Percentage Interest is not large enough to reach 51% as a
result of such purchase. Any balance of Duke's Percentage Interest shall be subject to the terms of
clause (i) above with RGraham participating with a Percentage Interest of 51%. RGraham shall
have 15 days after receipt of notice of Duke's Terminating Event to notify Duke or his successor of
RGraham's exercise of his purchase rights provided in this clause (ii).
(f)

Company's Purchase Rights. If the other Members fail to exercise their

rights to purchasefromthe Selling Member within the specified period hereinabove referred to, the
Company shall, for the 10-day period following the expiration period, have the option to purchase
such Membership Interest on identical terms and conditions. The Company may assign this right to
such Person as it chooses.
(g)

Sale to Third Party. If the other Members and the Company do not complete

the purchase of the entire Membership Interest offered by the Selling Member within 90 days after
termination of such 10-day period, the Selling Member may sell the portion of its unsold
Membership Interest to any third party, but only at the price (or the pro rata portion thereof) and
upon the terms provided in such offer and provided that the purchaser agrees to be bound by the
terms of this Agreement with the same force and effect as if it were an original party hereto.
3.5

Transfer on Termination.
(a)

Permissible Transfers. Upon the occurrence of a Terminating Event with

respect to a Member, such Member's successor may transfer the Terminated Member's Interests to
another Member, to the Company or its designee, to a member of the Terminated Member's family,
or to any of them, and on such terms, as the successor determines in its sole discretion.
(b)

Purchase Price. The '"Purchase Price" of a Member's Interest shall be

determined conclusively as follows: Except for the Transfers pursuant to paragraph 3.4(e)(i) and
(g) above, the Purchase Price shall be the value of the Company multiplied by the Percentage
Interests owned by a Terminated Member. The value of the Company shall be established by
t Aoncc\.s*
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negotiation between the persons who have or will have an interest in the Company. Absent such en
agreement, such value shall be determined by an independent certified public ac&ounting firm
mutually agreeable to all of the Members and its decision shall be binding. All periods for notices
of election to purchase under this agreement shall be extended by the period of time from the date
of such reference to the date of such decision by the accounting firm.
(c)

On any purchase pursuant to this paragraph 3.5, payments shall be made as

provided in the final sentence of paragraph 3.4(c).
3.6

Additional Members. If Members owning two-thirds, of all Percentage Interests

consent, the Managers may offer and sell additional Interests in the Company, either to existing
Members or to persons or entities not previously affiliated with the Company. Existing Members
will receive 30 days prior notice of such proposed offering and shall have the prior right to
participate by purchasing some or all of such additional Interests in the proportions of their
Percentage Interests. The Managers shall determine the terms and conditions of the sales of
additional Interests, including the consideration to be paid to the Company. The Manager shall
make appropriate adjustments in the capital accounts, Percentage Interests and other records of the
Company to reflect each additional Contribution based upon the fair market values of the net assets
of the Company relative to such Contributions and the prices established pursuant to paragraph
3.5(b).
3.7

Compensation to Managers.

The Managers shall determine their own

compensation, subject to the approval of a majority of the Members.
3.8

Liability and Indemnification.
(a)

Liability. To the extent permitted by law, no Manager, and no Member, shall

be liable, responsible, or accountable in damages or otherwise to the Company "or to any Member
for any act, omission or error in judgment performed, admitted or made-in good faith and in a
manner it believed to be within the scope of his authority and in the best interest of the Company;
provided that such act, omission or error in judgment does not constitute fraud, gross negligence,
willful misconduct or other clear breach offiduciaryduty.
(b)

Indemnity. To the extent permitted by law, the Company shall indemnify

and hold harmless each Manager and each Member from and against any loss, expense, damage or
injury suffered, sustained or incurred arising out of any actual or threatened action, suit, proceeding
or claim relating to its ownership in or activities on behalf of the Company, or in furtherance of the
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success of the Company, including, but not limited to, any judgment, award, settlement, reasonable
attorneys' fees, and other costs and expenses incurred in connection with the defense or settlement
of any actual or threatened action, suit proceeding or claim; provided, however, that the acts,
omissions, or alleged acts or omissions upon which such actual or threatened action, suit or
proceeding or claim is based or admitted was undertaken in good faith in a manner believed to be
advantageous to the Company and did not constitute fraud, gross negligence, willful misconduct or
other clear breach offiduciaryduty.
(c)

Expenses. The Company shall reimburse each Member and each Manager

for all costs and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in managing, promoting and furthering the
business and operations of the Company.
3.9

No Competing Activities. No Member or Manager, nor any affiliate of a Member

or Manager, may participate in any business which compete directly or indirectly with the business
of the Company in the Western United States for so long as it is a Member or Manager or an
affiliate of a Member or Manager or for two (2) years following termination of his status as a
Member of the Company, service as a Manager, or tenure as an affiliate of any Member or
Manager.
3.10

Time Devoted to Company Business; Standard of Care; Other Activities. The

Managers shall conduct the business in good faith and with the care that an ordinary prudent person
would exercise in a like position, under similar circumstances. The Managers shall conduct the
business in accordance with the best industry practices and in all material respects with the terms
and provisions of all agreements and permits pertaining to the business and in compliance in all
respects with applicable laws, except in each case where such non-compliance would not have a
material adverse effect on the business. The Managers shall devote reasonable time to the business
in order to properly manage and supervise the operations of the business, advise, consult and
manage risks, and otherwise discharge the Managers' responsibilities, to the Company.
ARTICLE 4
FINANCE
4.1

Contributions.
(a)

No Other Obligations. The Contribution of each Member is described in

paragraph 3.1(b). No Member shall be required to contribute additional capital to the Company and
no Member may contribute additional capital to the Company, without the consent of the Managers.
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Each Member acknowledges that Halbility for the return of its Contribution is limited to the
Company's assets.
(b)

Additional Members, A Person admitted as a Member in connection with the

acquisition of an Interest directly from the Company after the Effective Date will make the
Contributions specified in the agreement pursuant to which the Person is admitted as a Member.
(c)

Contributions Not Interest Bearing. A Member is not entitled to interest or

other compensation with respect to any cash or property it contributes to the Company.
(d)

No Return of Contribution. A Member is not entitled to the return of any

Contribution prior to the Company's dissolution and winding up.
4.2

Allocation of Profit and Loss.
(a)

General Tax Allocations. For federal income tax purposes, unless the Code

otherwise requires, items of income or loss shall first be allocated among the Members in order to
bring their Capital Account balances into the same proportions as their Percentage Interests. If one
or more Capital Account balances are greater than they would have been if such balances were in
the proportions of the Percentage Interests, then items of loss or deduction will be allocated to such
Members to the extent necessary to eliminate this disparity.

Thereafter, each item of the

Company's income, gain, loss or deduction will be allocated among the Members in the proportions
of their Percentage Interests.
(b)

Special Allocations,
QL)

If a Member unexpectedly receives an adjustment, allocation, or

distribution described in sections 1.704«l(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4), (5) or (6) of the Regulations that creates or
increases a deficit in the Member's Capital Account as of the end of a taxable year, a pro rata
portion of each item of the Company's income, including gross income and gain for the year and, if
necessary, for subsequent years will be allocated to the Member in an amount and manner sufficient
to eliminate the deficit in the Member's Capital Account as quickly as possible.
(ii)

If a Member would have a deficit in his or her Capital Account at the

end of a year that exceeds the sum of (i) the amount the Member is required to pay the Company
pursuant to an obligation described in section 1.704-l(b)(2)(ii)(c) of the Regulations, and (ii) the
Member's share of Minimum Gain, a pro rata portion of each item of the Company's income,
including gross income and gain, for the year will be allocated to the Member in an amount and
manner sufficient to eliminate the deficit in the Member's Capital Account as quickly as possible.
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(iii)

If there is a net decrease in the Company's Minimum Gain during a

year, the items of the Company's income, including gross income and gain, for the year and, if
necessary, for subsequent years will be allocated to the Members in proportion to their shares of the
net decrease in Minimum Gain. If the allocation made by this paragraph would cause a distortion in
the economic arrangement among the Members and it is expected that the Company will not have
sufficient income to correct that distortion, the Company may seek to have the Internal Revenue
Service waive the requirement for the allocation in accordance with section L704-2(f)(4) of the
Regulations.
(iv)

Items of the Company's loss, deductions and expenditures described

in Code section 705(a)(2)(B) that are attributable to nonrecourse debt and are characterized as
Member nonrecourse deductions under section 1.704-2(i) of the Regulations will be allocated to the
Members' Capital Accounts in accordance with section 1.704-2(i) of the Regulations.
(v)

Items of income, gain, loss and deduction with respect to property

contributed to the Company's capital will be allocated among the Members so as to take into
account any variation between book value and basis, to the extent and in the manner prescribed by
section 704(c) of the Code and related Regulations.
(vi)

If the special allocations result in Capital Account balances that are

different from the Capital Account balances the Members would have had if the special allocations
were not required, the Company will allocate other items of income, gain, loss and deduction in any
manner it considers appropriate to offset the effects of the special allocations on the Members'
Capital Account balances. Any offsetting allocation required by this paragraph is subject to and
must be consistent with the special allocations.
43

Distributions. If the Company has Available Funds, the Company may make

distributions to the Members and any Transferees in the ratios equal to their Percentage Interests.
4.4

Capital
(a)

General Maintenance. The Company will establish and maintain a Capital

Account for each Member in accordance with Regulation section L704-l(b)(2)(iv).
(b)

Compliance with Code, The requirements of this paragraph are intended and

will be construed to ensure that the allocations of the Company's income, gain, losses, deductions
and credits have substantial economic effect under the Regulations promulgated under section
704(b) of the Code.
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ARTICLE 5
RECORDS AND ACCOUNTING
5.1

Maintenance of Records.
(a)

Required Records. The Company will maintain at its principal place of

business such books, records and other materials as are reasonably necessary to document and
account for its activities, including, without limitation, those required to be maintained by the Act.
(b)

Member Access. Each Member (and its authorized representative) will have

reasonable access to and may inspect and copy all books, records and other materials pertaining to
the Company or its activities. The exercise of such rights will be at the requesting Member's
expense.
(c)

Confidentiality. No Member will disclose any information relating to the

Company or its activities to any unauthorized person or use any such information for any Person's
personal gain.
5.2

Financial Accounting.
(a)

Accounting Method. The Company will account for its financial transactions

using a method of accounting determined by the Managers in compliance with sections 446 and 448
of the Code.
(b)

Taxable Year. The Company's taxable year and the Company's annual

accounting period is the calendar year, unless otherwise determined by the Manager in compliance
with sections 441,444 and 706 of the Code.
53

Reports.
(a)

Members. As soon as practicable after the close of each year, the Company

will prepare and send to the Members such reports and information as; are reasonably necessary to
(1) inform the Members of the results of the Company's operations for the prior year and (2) enable
the Members to completely and accurately reflect their distributive shares of the Company's losses,
profits, gains, deductions and credits in their federal, state and local income tax returns for the
appropriate year.
(b)

Periodic Reports. The Company will complete and file any periodic reports

required by the Act or the law of any other jurisdiction in which the Company is qualified to do
business.
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5.4

Tax Withholding. If the Company is required to withhold and pay over to a

governmental agency any part or all of a Distribution or allocation of profit to a Member:
(i)

the amount withheld will be considered a Distribution to the Member,

(ii)

if the withholding requirement pertains to a Distribution in kind or an

and
allocation of profit, the Company will pay the amount required to be withheld to the governmental
agency and promptly take such action as it considers necessary or appropriate to recover a like
amount from the Member, including offset against any Distributions to which the Member would
otherwise be entitled.
ARTICLE 6
DISSOLUTION
6.1

Events of Dissolution.
(a)

Enumeration, The Company will dissolve upon thefirstto occur of:
(i)

the expiration of the term set forth in paragraph 2.3;

(ii)

the vote of Members holding a majority of all outstanding Percentage

Interests to dissolve the Company;
(iii)

any event that makes the Company ineligible to conduct its activities

as a limited liability company under the Act; or
(iv)

any event or circumstance that makes it unlawful or impossible for the

Company to carry on its business.
(b)

Exclusivity of Events. Unless specifically referred to in this paragraph, no

event, including an event of dissolution prescribed by the Act, will result in the Company's
dissolution.
6.2

Effect of Dissolution.
(a)

Appointment of Liquidator. Upon the Company's dissolution, the Manager

may appoint a liquidator, who may but need not be a Member. The liquidator will wind up and
liquidate the Company in an orderly, prudent and expeditious manner in accordance with the
following provisions of this paragraph 62.
(b)

Final Accounting. The liquidator will make proper accountings (1) to the end

of the month in which the event of dissolution occurred and (2) to the date on which the Company is
finally and completely liquidated.
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(c)

Duties and Authority of Liquidator, The liquidator will make adequate

provision for the discharge of all of the Company's debts, obUgations and liabilities. The Hquidator
may sell, encumber or retain for distribution in kind any of the Company's assets. Any gain or loss
recognized on the sale of assets will be allocated to the Members' Capital Accounts in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 4.2. With respect to any asset the hquidator determines to retain
for distribution in kind, the hquidator will allocate to the Members' Capital Accounts the amount of
gain or loss that would have been recognized had the asset been sold at its fair market value.
(d)

Final Distribution. The liquidator will distribute any assets remaining after

the discharge or accommodation of the Company's debts, obUgations and liabilities to the Members
in proportion to their Capital Accounts. The hquidator wiU distribute any assets distributable in
kind to the Members in undivided interests as tenants in common. A Member whose Capital
Account is negative will have no UabiUty to the Company, the Company's creditors or any other
Member with respect to the negative balance.
(e)

Required Filings.

The hquidator wiU file with the UtaJi Division of

Corporations and Commercial Code such statements, certificates and other instruments, and take
such other actions, as are reasonably necessary or appropriate to effectuate and confirm the
cessation of the Company's existence,
ARTICLE 7
GENERAL PROVISIONS
7.1

Amendments. This Agreement may be amended only with the cons;ent or approval

of Members with Percentage Interests of at least two-thirds. No amendment may affect any
Member except pro rata with aU Members- The Managers are authorized and directed to execute
and file any amendment to the Articles required by the Act. If any such ameAclment results in
inconsistencies between the Articles and this Agreement, this Agreement wiU be considered to have
been amended in the specifics necessary to eliminate the inconsistencies.
12

Notices. Notices contemplated by this Agreement may be sent by any commercially

reasonable means, including hand deUvery, first class mail, or private courier. The notice must be
prepaid and addressed as set forth in the Company's records. The notice will be effective on the
date of receipt or, in the case of notice sent by first class mail, thefifthday after mailing.
7.3

Resolution of Inconsistencies. If there are inconsistencies between this Agreement

and the Articles, the Articles will control. If there are inconsistencies between this. Agreement and
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the Act, this Agreement will control, except to the extent the inconsistencies relate to provisions of
the Act that the Company cannot alter by agreement Without limiting the generality of the
foregoing, unless the language or context clearly indicates a different intent, the provisions of this
Agreement pertaining to the Company's governance and financial affairs and the rights of the
Members upon dissolution will supersede the provisions of the Act relating to the same matters.
7.4

Additional Instruments. Each Member will execute and deliver any document or

statement necessary to give effect to the terms of this Agreement or to comply with any law, rule or
regulation governing the Company's formation and activities.
7.5

Computation of Time. In computing any period of time under this Agreement, the

day of the act or event from which the specified period begins to run is not be included. The last
day of the period is included, unless it is a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday, in which case the
period will run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday or legal holiday.
7.6

Entire Agreement This Agreement and the Articles comprise the entire agreement

among the parties with respect to the Company. This Agreement and the Articles supersede any
prior agreements or understandings with respect to the Company. No representation, statement or
condition not contained in this Agreement or the Articles has any force or effect
7.7

Waiver. No right under this Agreement may be waived, except by an instrument in

writing signed by the party sought to be charged with the waiver.
7.8

General Construction Principles. Words in any gender are deemed to include any

other gender. The singular is deemed to include the plural and vice versa. Headings and underlined
paragraph titles are for guidance only and have no significance in the interpretation of this
Agreement
7.9

Binding Effect.

Subject to the provisions of this Agreement relating to the

transferability of Stock and therightsof Transferees, this Agreement is binding on and will inure to
the benefit of the Company, the Members and their respective distributees, successors and assigns.
7.10

Governing Law. Utah law governs the construction and application of the terms of

this Agreement.
7.11

Counterparts. This Agreement may be executed in counterparts, each of which will

be considered an original.
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ARTICLE 8
DISPUTE RESOLUTION.
8.1

Negotiation. In the event that there is a dispute among the Members arising out of

or relating to this Agreement or to the operation of the Company, the parties shall attempt in good
faith to resolve such dispute promptly by negotiation. Any party may give each other party written
notice that a dispute exists (a "Notice of Disputed. The Notice of Dispute shall include a statement
of such party's position. Within ten days of the delivery of the Notice of Dispute, the parties shall
meet at a mutually acceptable time and place, and attempt to resolve the dispute. All documents
and other information or data on which each party relies concerning the dispute shall be furnished
or made available on reasonable terms to each other party at least five business days before the first
meeting of the parties as provided by this paragraph 8.L
8.2

Mediation. If the dispute has not been resolved by negotiation within twenty days

of the delivery of a Notice of Dispute, the parties shall endeavor to settle the dispute by mediation
under the then current CPR Model Mediation Procedure for Business Disputes ("CPR") or the
comparable provisions of the mediation rules of the American Arbitration Association ("AAA") or
the rules of any other reputable organization that sponsors mediation as the parties determine (the
"Rules"). Unless otherwise agreed, the parties shall agree upon a mediator or, if they cannot agree
upon a mediator within five days of commencement of the mediation procedure, then they shall
select a mediator pursuant to the CPR, AAA or other organization's rules, as appropriate. Expenses
of mediation shall be divided equally between the parties to the dispute.
83

Arbitration.
(a)

In General.

Assuming the inability of the Member to resolve their

differences as provided in paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2, the controversy or claim arising out of or relating
to this Agreement or any agreement or document in connection therewith (including any question
arising under paragraph 3.5(c) and questions as to whether or not any dispute falls within the terms
of this paragraph or the selection of arbitrators) shall be settled by arbitration in Salt Lake City,
Utah in accordance with the Rules, by a single arbitrator mutually acceptable to the parties, as the
parties shall agree, or as designated by the initiating party. Any party may initiate arbitration from
and after 60 days following the delivery of a Notice of Dispute if the dispute has not then been
settled by negotiation or mediation. The arbitration procedure shall be governed by the United
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States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16, and the award rendered by the arbitrator shall be final and
binding on the parties and may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof.
(b)

Discovery. Each party shall have discovery rights as provided by the Federal

Rules of Civil Procedure; provided, however, that all such discovery shall be commenced and
concluded within forty-five (45) days of the initiation of arbitration.
(c)

Efficient Proceedings. It is the intent of the parties that any arbitration shall

be concluded as quickly as reasonably practicable. Unless the parties otherwise agree, once
commenced, the hearing on the disputed matters shall be held at least four days a week until
concluded, with each hearing date to begin at 9:00 a.m. and to conclude at 5:00 p.m. The arbitrator
shall use all reasonable efforts to issue the final award or awards within a period of five business
days after closure of the proceedings. Failure of the arbitrator to meet the time limits of this
paragraph 8.3 shall not be a basis for challenging the award. The parties shall maintain as
confidential the existence and result of the mediation and arbitration.
(d)

Allocation of Costs. The arbitrator may instruct the non-prevailing party to

pay all costs of the proceedings, including the fees and expenses of the arbitrator and the reasonable
attorneys' fees and expenses of the prevailing party, but only if the prevailing party shall have
complied with the provisions of paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2 above. In the absence of such instruction,
the parties shall bear their own costs and share equally the fees and expenses of the arbitrator.
8.4

Ancillary Proceedings- Any legal proceeding instituted to enforce an arbitration

award hereunder may be brought in a court of competent jurisdiction (either state or federal) in Salt
Lake County, Utah. Each party hereby submits to personal jurisdiction there, irrevocably waives
any objection as to venue, and further agrees not to plead or claim in any such court that any such
proceeding has been brought in an inconvenient forum. Nothing herein shall be construed to
prevent any party from seeking equitable relief in such courts or in any court of competent
jurisdiction to restrain or prohibit any breach or threatened breach of any covenant of the parties set
forth in this Agreement, whether or not the parties have first sought to resolve the dispute through
negotiation, mediation or arbitration.
Signed on the respective dates set forth below, to be effective as of the Effective Date.
COMPANY:
WAY COOL DIRT CHEAP, LLC
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Date

/ V / - #3

By:

Date: 7 / / y / W > 3

^ < ^ ^ ^ ^

By:

MEMBERS:

Date:

7f/^/zoo^

Date: /"/f-$

£

Date: 7 7 7 5 / ^ ^ 3
DAVID S. GRAHAM

Date:Cyi /&

jfo\

\Ao-(M

QQ(MM.

MARIA del CARMEN ZAVALA CARDENAS
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EXHIBIT "A"
CAPITAL CONTRIBUTIONS
RGraham has contributed cash in the amount of Seventy Five Thousand Dollars ($75,000).
Duke has contributed the following described property with an agreed upon value of $150,000:
DGraham shall contribute cash in the amount of Sixty Thousand Dollars ($60,000).
Carmen shall contribute her promissory note for $100.00, due on August 1,2005.

CATCH ALL PROVISIONS
Any and all other property used in connection with the operation of Way Cool Dirt Cheap.

1Q

ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 2

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Russell S. Walker, #3363
David R. Williams, #6686
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

OCT J \ 2005
SALTU^u-oUNTY
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Randal Graham
and David S. Graham
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA DEL
CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS, an
individual,

ORDER CONFIRMING
ARBITRATION AWARD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDAL GRAHAM, an individual; DAVID
S. GRAHAM, an individual; and CRAIG R.
MARIGER, in his capacity as purported
arbitrator herein,

Civil No. 040925274
Judge John Paul Kennedy

Defendants.

Randal Graham and David Graham moved for an order confirming an arbitration award
and for a judgment conforming to the arbitration award. Pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code
Ann. §78-3 la-123 and Utah Code Ann. §78-31a-126,
IT IS ORDERED:
1.

The Award issued by arbitrator Kent B. Scott on August 11,2005 (the "Award")
1

is confirmed. A copy of the Award is attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this
reference.
2.

A judgment conforming to the Award shall be entered. The judgment may be

recorded, docketed and enforced as any other judgment in a civil case.
DATED this {tf

day of October, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

XA*4

>1 ^—1

X Court Judge'
E OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this
day of October, 2005,1 faxed and mailed by U.S. First
Class Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER CONFIRMING ARBITRATION
AWARD, postage prepaid to the following:
Nick J. Colessides
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
SLC,UT 84111-3325
Facsimile: (801) 521-4452

2

EXHIBIT "A"

THE ARBITRATION OF GRAHAM VS. DUKE
3

(In the Matter of the Arbitration between:

4

iRANDALL FRAHAM & DAVID GRAHAM

5

AWARD

Claimants,
Case No. 04092574

6

vs.
Arbitrator: Kent B. Scott

7

[TED DUKE & MARIA DEL CARMEN

8

IZAVALA CARDENAS

9

Respondents.

10

INTRODUCTION

1]
12

THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been duly appointed by the parties in

13

accordance with the terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt

14

Cheap dated July 18, 2003 ("Operating Agreement"), and the arbitration of this case having been

15

ordered by the Hon. Bruce C. Lubeck, District Court Judge under his Order of February 23,

16

2005, and the Arbitrator having conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 13 & 14 and July 21,

17

22, 23, 24, 2005, and having further conducted oral arguments on July 29, 2005, in Salt Lake

18

City, Utah, in which the parlies and counsel were all present, now enters the following:
AWARD

19
20

1. Ted Duke ("Duke") and Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Zavala") are expelled

21

as members of the Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ("WCDC) by virtue of section 48-2c-

22

710(3)(a)and(c)UCA.

23

2.

24
25

Duke and Zavala are to become assignees as defined in section 48~2c-708 UCA with
the rights and privileges as defined in section 48-2c-l 102 UCA.

3.

Randall Graham ("R Graham") and David Graham ("D. Graham") have failed to
sustain their burden of proof in showing that Duke and Zavala converted for their
ORDER -1

personal use and benefit the profits from the St George store and are therefore
entitled to no amount for this claim.
4. R.. Graham and D. Graham's claims for the $7,019 and the $12,095 as well as other
claims for converted cash are denied as the weight of the evidence showed that Duke
and Zavala used these monies for WCDC and OWCDC operations and inventory and
not for their own personal use.
5. Duke and Zavala converted the inventory, accounts, equipment, name, good will, the
St. George store leasehold interest, trade fixtures and other assets of WCDC when
they created Original Way Cool Dirt Cheap ("OWCDC") and used those assets in the
OWCDC operations. Duke and Zavala are ordered to return the same to WCDC
forthwith as of the date of this award.
6. Duke and Zavala, by creating and operating OWCDC are in violation of paragraph
3.9 of the Operating Agreement. The terms of paragraph 3.9 of the Operating
Agreement are modified to reduce the geographical area of non-competition from that
of the Western United States to Utah. Duke and Zavala are restrained and prohibited
from competing with WCDC in the State of Utah for a period of two years from the
date of this Award as provided for in paragraph 3.9 of the Operating Agreement.
7. Duke's and Zavala's claims to dissolve and distribute the assets of WCDC and
OWCDC assets are denied.
8. R- Graham and D. Graham arc the prevailing parties in this action concerning their
claims for Breach of the Operating Agreement, Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty
and Expulsion. They did not prevail on their claim for damages for accounting and
conversion of profits derived from the St. George store operating as either WCDC or
OWCDC. They are awarded their attorneys fees in the amount of S31,830 which
amount represents one half of the fees incurred with Woodbury & Kesler. The fees of

ORDER - 2

S8,000 for Paul Moxley and Kathryn Brabson and S900 for the firm of Barney &
2 11

McKennna are fees that are, according to the Affidavit of Lily Graham, relaied to the

3

negotiation and mediation of the dispute and do not otherwise fall under paragraph

4

8.3 (d) of the Operating Agreement as attorneys fees incurred in connection with this

5

arbitration.

6 JJ
7

9, Each of the parties are to bear their own costs including the arbitrator fees paid by
each to all arbitrators that have served in this matter.
ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN COMMENTS

S
9

At the request of the parties, I am providing the following comments in connection with

10

the Award. The comments are not to be construed or taken to be findings of fact or conclusions

11

of law. They are provided to assist the parties and their counsel to understand the reasons that

12

form the basis for the Award.

13

1 „ The parties entered into The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way

14

Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC dated July 18,2003 ("Operating Agreement") _ Exhibit C-5.

15

This Operating Agreement amended all previous negotiations and the previous

16

Operating Agreement dated February 28, 2003 ("First Operating Agreement") -

17

Exhibit C-4.

IS
19

2. Under the terms of the Operating Agreement R. Graham was to invest and did pay
the amount of $75,000. He was not required to invest an additional $15,000.

20

3. The Operating Agreement (Exhibit C-5) and the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act

21

(section 48-2c-101 et seq. UCA) provide to rules and procedures for operating an

22

LLC. When disputes arise among the members, managers or both, there are

23

provisions that govern the resolution of those disputes. Rather than follow the roles

24

and procedures for resolving disputes under the Operating Agreement (paragraph 8)

25

or the Revise Utah LLC Act, Duke and Zavala engaged in a course of conduct of self

ORDER-3

help and self dealing that justifies their expulsion from the WCDC. To permit this
course of conduct would encourage a departure from the rule of law and would
render contract terms and the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act
meaningless. Among those reasons that form the basis for the expulsion of Duke and
Zavala are:
a. Failure to communicate with R. Graham and D. Graham or their designated
representatives after October, 2003.
b. Abusive threats and ultimatums from Duke to R. Graham.
c. Summarily dismissing the Staff of the St. George store and locking out R.
Graham and D. Graham.
& Diverting two truckloads of inventory paid with funds loaned by R.
Graham which were destined for the Draper store and causing them to be
delivered to the St. George store.
e. Failure to account for inventory or the proceeds derived from the sale of
the St George Store after January, 2004.
f. Creating a new LLC (O WCDC) with a new tax number bank account and
converting the assets of WCDC for its operations and benefit
g. Creating a competing business using the name, good will, lease, inventory,
equipment, trade fixtures, and connections with the Mexico operations to
compete with WCDC.
h. Failure to account for the revenues and costs of operation of the St
George Store of WCDC or OWCDC.
L Failure to take meaningful steps to participate in good faith in the dispute
resolution procedures set out in paragraph 8 of the Operating Agreement

ORDER-4

In stead of so participating. Duke and Zavala created the OC WDC entity
and converted the assets of WCDC to in order to operate OWCDC.
The aforementioned actions and omissions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under
paragraph 3.8 of the Operating Agreement and also creates a violation of section 482c-710 (3) (a) and (c) UCA wherein said activities have "adversely and materially
affected the company's business'5 and "makes it not reasonably practicable to carry
on the business with the member."
Duke and Zavala have provided evidence of R. Graham's misconduct which in the
view of the arbitrator does not constitute a violation of paragraph 3.8 of the Operating
Agreement or section 48-2c-710 (3) (a) and (c). There was no requirement under the
Operating Agreement for R. Graham to invest an additional $15,000. Duke and
Zavala cite dissatisfaction with R. Graham in the way he handled the selection of the
Draper Store site and the construction of the tenant improvements. Duke and Zavala
also had differences of opinion with R. Graham concerning the need for cash with
which to purchase inventory. R. Graham was not required to loan or invest additional
cash into the business although the evidence establishes that substantial loans and
advances were provided due to the lack of cash flow caused by the slow construction
and inability to immediately money earmarked for tenant improvements to purchase
inventory. Duke and Zavala also complain about the competence of R. Graham and
people he hired to set up and operate both the Draper and St George Stores. The
arbitrator finds that R. Graham may have committed errors in judgment in connection
with these matters, but always acted in good faith and in a manner he "believed to be
within the scope of his authority and in the best interest of the Company.. ." (See
paragraph 3.8 of the Operating Agreement).

ORDER - 5

6. With the expulsion of Duke and Zavala form WCDC it is the intent of the arbitrator
to designate them as assignees as provided for in section 48-2c-708 UCA with the
rights and privileges as defined in section 48-2c-l 102 UCA.
7. Also, with the expulsion of Duke and Zavala, all assets of WCDC and OWCDC are
to be placed in control of R Graham and D. Graham, the two remaining members and
R. Gragam as the remaining manager. These assets are to include but not be limited
to accounts, inventory, equipment, furniture, leaseholds, trade fixtures, the name, and
good will as of the date of this award.
8. Paragraph 3.9 is the non-compete clause in the Operating Agreement It is too broad
in its application as to the Western United States. WCD maintains stores in Utah
only and the non-compete clause is hereby restricted to the geographical boundaries
of Utah. All of the other terms of the non-compete clause are to remain in full force.
9. Concerning R.Graham's and D. Graham's claims against Duke and Zavala for failure
to account for lost profits: Although there is evidence that the St George store has
realized profits (Exhibits C-10 and C-l 1) there is no evidence as to what happened to
those profits. There was no evidence showing that monies were diverted to accounts
other than the WCDC or OWCDC accounts. There was no evidence that Duke or
Zavala took monies from the sale of WCDC or OWCDC inventory and used them for
their personal or separate business purposed. For example, the ATM withdrawals
and checks in summarized in Exhibit 2 pp. 10-11 were used to pay the costs of
operating the business and the $7,019 withdrawn from the WCDC account in placed
in Duke's personal account was used to purchase inventory for either WCDC or
OWCDC. The testimony of Lily Graham, Craig Ainge and Jamie Clawson did not
reveal any improprieties. There was a lot of disagreement over what store had what
level of inventory, but never a showing that inventory, revenues or profits had been

ORDER-6

1

taken or converted by Duke or Zavala. Also, Craig Ainge testified of discrepancies

2 JJ

between sales and deposits but could not make a connection or establish that Duke or
Zavala converted the differences in amounts to their personal use. The burden of

4 II

p r o o f as to the lost profits claims is on the Claimants w h o , in the opinion of the

5

arbitrator, did not meet their burden with the accounting testimony furnished by Craig

6

Ainge, Jamie Clawson or Lily Graham. .

7

lOJh addition to the initial investment of $75,000 by R, Graham and $60,000 by D.

8

Graham (the only cash invested in WCDC) R. Graham provided for additional capital

9

and security at his personal expense which was used to purchase inventory and pay

10

the operating expenses of WCDC. Among the financial contributions R. Graham

I*

provided the following:

12

a. Guaranty of the five year Draper lease at a cost of approximately $ 14,000

13

per month - which obligation included the balance of the tenant

14

improvement money ($ 102,000) that was used to pay for company

15

expenses and inventory.

16
17
18
19

b. $47,000 personal loan December 3, 2003 used for inventory, shipping and
general company expenses.
c Line of credit for $100,000 established in May, 2004 secured by a lien on
the R. Graham home.

20

d. $75,000 Joe Groot loan

21

e. $75,000 Leo Pavich loan

22

f. $50,000 family loan to R. Graham used for company expenses

23

g. $10,000 Washington Mutual loan used for company expenses

24

h. undetermined - personal and RDG credit cards

25
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11. In addition to the capital R. Graham infused into WCDC he accrued salary of

1
2

S60.098 and his wife, Lily, accrued salary of Si 8,000. D. Graham accrued salary of

3

$36,000.

4
5

CONCLUSION
The arbitrator confirms that this Award is a complete disposition of all the issues

6

submitted to him under the terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way

7

Cool Dirt Cheap dated July 18, 2003 ("Operating Agreement"), and the Order of Hon. Bruce C.

8

Lubeck, District Court Judge, of February 23,2005, evidence and legal arguments on which

9

issues was presented at'the hearings held in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 13 & 14,2005; July 21,

10

22, 23,24,2005; and July 29,2005.

11
12
13

DATED
Kjent B. Scott, Arbitrator

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Russell S. Walker, #3363
David R. Williams, #6686
WOODBURY & KESLER, P.C.
265 East 100 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 3358
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3358
Telephone: (801) 364-1100

FILED DISTRICT CCURT
Third Judicial District

OCT 1 h 2005
SALT LAKE
^ObUNTY
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Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Randal Graham
and David S. Graham
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA DEL
CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS, an
individual,

JUDGEMENT CONFORMING TO
ARBITRATION AWARD

Plaintiffs,
vs.
RANDAL GRAHAM, an individual; DAVID
S. GRAHAM, an individual; and CRAIG R.
MARIGER, in his capacity as purported
arbitrator herein,
Defendants.

Civil No. 040925274
Judge John Paul Kennedy
ENTERED IN REGISTRY
OF JUDGMENTS
DATE,, / ( I 2-j O ? * . -

The Court granted Randal and David Graham's Motion for Order Confirming Arbitration
Award and for Judgment Conforming to the Award. For the reasons set forth in the in the Award
of Arbitrator Kent B. Scott dated August 11, 2005 (the "Award"), the court enters judgment as
follows:

Judgment (

I to Arbitration Award <

040925274

JD17580478
CARDENAS,MARIA DEL CARMEN SAV

INTRODUCTION
[KENT B. SCOTT], having been duly appointed by the parties in accordance with the
terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt Cheap dated July
18, 2003 ("Operating Agreement"), and the arbitration of this case having been ordered by the
Hon. Bruce C. Lubeck, District Court Judge under his Order of February 23, 2005, and the
Arbitrator having conducted and evidentiary hearing on June 23 & 24 and Juy 21, 22, 23, 24,
2005, and having further conducted oral arguments on July 29,2005, in Salt Lake City, Utah, in
which the parties and counsel were all present, now enters the following:
AWARD
1.

Ted Duke ("Duke) and Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Zavala") are
expelled as members of the Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ("WCDC") by virtue of
section 48-2c-710(3)(a) and (c) UCA.

2.

Duke and Zavala are to become assignees as defined in section 48-2c-708 UCA
with the rights and privileges as defined in 48-2c-l 102 UCA.

3.

Randall Graham ("R.Graham") and David Graham ("D.Graham") have failed to
sustain their burden of proof in showing that Duke and Zavala converted for their
personal use and benefit the profits fro the St. George store and are therefore
entitled to no amount for this claim.

4.

R. Graham and D. Graham's claims for the $7019 and the $12,095 as well as

2

other claims for converted cash are denied as the weight of the evidence showed
that Duke and Zavala used these monies for WCDC and OWCDC operations and
inventory and not for their personal use.
5.

Duke and Zavala converted the inventory, accounts, equipment, name, good will,
the St. George leasehold interest, trade fixtures and other assets of WCDC when
they created Original Way Cool Dirt Cheap ("OWCDC") and used those assets in
the OWCDC operations. Duke and Zavala are ordered to return the same to
WCDC forthwith as of the date of this award.

6.

Duke and Zavala, by creating and operating OWCDC are in violation of paragraph
3.9 of the Operating Agreement. The terms of paragraph 3.9 of the Operating
Agreement are modified to reduce the geographical area of non-competition from
that of the Western United States to Utah. Duke and Zavala are restrained and
prohibited from competing with WCDC in the State of Utah for a period of two
yearsfromthe date of this Award as provided for in paragraph 3.9 of the
Operating Agreement.

7.

Duke's and Zavala'as claims to dissolve and distribute the assets of WCDC and
OWCDC assets are denied.

8.

R. Graham and D. Graham are the prevailing parties in this action concerning
their claims for Breach of the Operating Agreement, Conversion, Breach of

3

Fiduciary Duty and Expulsion. They did not prevail on their claim for damages
for accounting and conversion of profits derived from the St. George store
operating either as WCDC or OWCDC. They are awarded their attorneys fees in
the amount of $32,830 which amount represents on half of the fees incurred with
Woodbury & Kesler. The fees of $8,000 for Paul Moxley and Kathryn Branbson
and $900 for the firm of Barney & Mckenna are fees that are, according to the
Affidavit of Lily Graham, related to the negotiation and mediation of the dispute
and do not otherwise fall under paragraph 8.3(d) of the Operating Agreement as
attorney fees incurred in connection with this arbitration.
9.

Each of the parties are to bear their own costs including the arbitrator fees paid by
each to all arbitrators that have served in this matter.
ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN COMMENTS

At the request of the parties, [the Arbitrator is] providing the following comments in
connection with the Award. The comments are not to be construed or taken to befindingsof fact
or conclusions of law. They are provided to assist the parties and their counsel to understand the
reasons that form the basis for the Award.
1.

The parties entered into The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way
Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC dated July 18,2003 ("Operating Agreement")-Exhibit C-5.
This Operating Agreement amended all previous negotiations and the previous
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Operating Agreement dated February 28, 2003 ("First Operating AgreementsExhibit C-4.
2.

Under the terms of the Operating Agreement R. Graham was to invest and did pay
the amount $75,000. He was not required to invest an additional $15,000.

3.

The Operating Agreement (Exhibit C-5) and the Utah Revised Limited Liability
Act (section 48-2c-101 et seq. UCA) provide rules and procedures for operating
an LLC. When disputes arise among the members, managers or both, there are
provisions that govern the resolution of those disputes. Rather than follow the
rules and procedures for resolving disputes under the Operating Agreement
(paragraph 8) or the Revised Utah LLC Act, Duke and Zavala engaged in a course
of conduct of self help and self dealing that justifies their expulsionfromthe
WCDC. To permit this course of conduct would encourage a departurefromthe
rule of law and would render contract terms and the Utah Revised Limited
Liability Company Act meaningless. Among those reasons that form the basis for
the expulsion of Duke and Zavala are:
a.

Failure to communicate with R. Graham and D. Graham or their
designated representatives after October, 2003.

b.

Abusive threats and ultimatums from Duke to R. Graham.

c.

Summarily dismissing the Staff of the St. George store and locking out R.
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Graham and D. Graham.
d.

Diverting two truckloads of inventory paid with funds loaned by R.
Graham which were destined for the Draper store and causing them to be
delivered to the St. George store.

e.

Failure to account for inventory or the proceeds derived from the sale of
the St. George store after January, 2004.

f.

Creating a new LLC (OWCDC) with a new tax number, bank account and
converting assets of WCDC for its operations and benefit.

g.

Creating a competing business using the name, good will, lease, inventory,
equipment, tradefixtures,and connections with the Mexico operations to
compete with WCDC.

h.

Failure to account for the revenues and costs of operation of the St. George
Store of WCDC or OWCDC.

i.

Failure to take meaningful steps to participate in good faith in the dipute
resolution procedures set out in paragraph 8 of the Operating Agreement.
Instead of so participating, Duke and Zavala created the OWCDC entity
and converted the assets of WCDC to in order to operate OWCDC.

4.

The aforementioned actions and omissions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty
under paragraph 3.8 of the Operating Agreement and also creates a violation of
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section 48-2c-710 (3) (a) and (c) UCA wherein said activities have "adversely and
materially affected the company's business" and "makes it not reasonably
practicable to carry on the business with the member."
5.

Duke and Zavala have provided evidence of R. Graham's misconduct which in the
view of the arbitrator does not constitute a violation of paragraph 3.8 of the
Operating Agreement or section 48-2c-710 (3) (a) and (c). There was no
requirement under he Operating Agreement for R. Graham to invest an additional
$15,000. Duke and Zavala cite dissatisfaction with R. Graham in the way he
handled the selection of the Draper Store site and the construction of the tenant
improvements. Duke and Zavala also had differences of opinion with R. Graham
concerning the need for cash with which to purchase inventory. R. Graham was
not required to loan or invest additional cash into the business although the
evidence establishes that substantial loans and advances were provided due to the
lack of cash flow caused by the slow construction and inability to immediately
money earmarked for tenant improvements to purchase inventory. Duke and
Zavala also complain about the competence of R. Graham and people he hired to
set up and operate both the Draper and St. George Stores. The arbitrator finds the
R. Graham may have committed errors in judgement in connection with these
matters, but always acted in good faith and in a manner he "believed to be within
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the scope of his authority and in the best interest of the Company.. ." (See
paragraph 3.8 of the Operating Agreement).
6.

With the expulsion of Duke and Zavala form WCDC it is the intent of the
arbitrator to designate them as assignees as provided for in section 48-2c-708
UCA with the rights and privileges as defined in section 48-2c-l 102 UCA.

7.

Also, with the expulsion of Duke and Zavala, all assets of WCDC and O WCDC
are to be placed in control of R. Graham and D. Graham, the two remaining
members and R. Graham as the remaining manager. These assets are 1o include
but not to be limited to accounts, inventory, equipment, furniture, leaseholds,
trade fixtures, the name, and good will as of the date of this award.

8.

Paragraph 3.9 is the non-compete clause in the Operating Agreement. It is too
broad in its application as to the Wester United States. WCDC maintains stores in
Utah only and the non-compete clause is hereby restricted to the geographical
' boundaries of Utah. All of the other terms of the non-compete clause are to
remain in full force.

9.

Concerning R. Graham's and D. Graham's claims against Duke and Z,avala for
failure to account for lost profits: Although there is evidence that the St. George
store has realized profits (Exhibits C-10 and C-11) there is no evidence as to what
happened to those profits. There was no evidence showing that monies were
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diverted to accounts other than the WCDC or OWCDC accounts. There was no
evidence that Duke or Zavala took moniesfromthe sale of WCDC or OWCDC
inventory and used them for their personal or separate business purposed. For
example, the ATM withdrawals and checks in summarized in Exhibit 2 pp. 10-11
were used to pay the costs of operating the business and the $7,019 withdrawn
from the WCDC account in placed in Duke's personal account was used to
purchase inventory for either WCDC or OWCDC. The testimony of Lily Graham,
Craig Ainge and Jamie Clawson did not reveal any improprieties. There was a lot
of disagreement over what store had what level of inventory, but never a showing
that inventory, revenues or profits had been taken or converted by Duke or Zavala.
Also, Craig Ainge testified of discrepancies between sales and deposits but could
not make a connection or establish that Duke or Zavala converted the differences
in amounts to their personal use. The burden of proof as to the lost profits claims
is on the Claimants who, in the opinion of the arbitrator, did not meet their burden
with the accounting testimony furnished by Craig Ainge, Jamie Clawson or Lily
Graham.
In addition to the initial investment of $75,000 by R. Graham and $60,000 by D.
Graham (the only cash invested in WCDC) R. Graham provided for additional
capital and security at his personal expense which was used to purchase inventory

9

and pay the operating expenses of WCDC. Among the financial contributions R.
Graham provided the following:
a*

Guaranty of thefiveyear Draper lease at a cost of approximately $ 14,000
per month - which obligation included the balance of the tenant
improvement money ($102,000) that was used to pay for company
expenses and inventory.

b.

$47,000 personal loan December 3, 2003 used for inventory, shipping and
general company expenses.

c.

Line of credit for $ 100,000 established in May, 2004 secured by a lien of
the R. Graham home.

11.

d.

$75,000 Joe Groot loan.

e.

$75,000 Leo Pavich loan.

f.

$50,000 family loan to R. Graham used for company expenses.

g.

$10,000 Washington Mutual loan used for company expenses.

h.

undetermined - personal and RDG credit cards.

In addition to the capital R. Graham infused into WCDC he accrued salary of
$60,098 and his wife, Lily, accrued salary of $18,000. D. Graham accrued salary
of $36,000.
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CONCLUSION
The arbitrator confirms that this Award is a complete disposition of all the issues
submitted to him under the terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way
Cool Dirt Cheap dated July 18,2003 ("Operating Agreement"), and the Order of Hon. Bruce C.
Lubeck, District Court Judge, of February 23,2005, evidence and legal arguments on which
issues was presented at the hearing held in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 13 & 14,2005; July 21,
22,23,24,2005; and July 29,2005.
A copy of the Award is attached as Exhibit "A" and incorporated by this reference.
DATED this / / day of October, 2005.
BY THE COURT:

OF SERVICE
day of October, 2005,1 faxed and mailed by U.S. First
I hereby certify that on this
Class Mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGEMENT CONFORMING TO
ARBITRATION AWARD, postage prepaid to the following:
Nick J. Colessides
466 South 400 East, Suite 100
SLC,UT 84111-3325
Facsimile: (801) 521-4452
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EXHIBIT "A"

THE ARBITRATION OF GRAHAM VS. DUKE
|In the Matter of the Arbitration between:
BRAND ALL FRAHAM & DAVID GRAHAM
Claimants,

AWARD
Case No. 04092574

vs.

Arbitrator: Kent B.Scott

[TED DUKE & MARIA DEL CARMEN
IZAVALA CARDENAS
Respondents.

INTRODUCTION
THE UNDERSIGNED ARBITRATOR, having been duly appointed by the parties in
accordance with the terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way Cool Dirt
Cheap dated July 18, 2003 ("Operating Agreement"), and the arbitration of this case having been
ordered by the Hon. Bruce C. Lubeck, District Court Judge under his Order of February 23,
2005, and the Arbitrator having conducted an evidentiary hearing on June 13 & 14 and July 21,
22. 23, 24, 2005, and having further conducted oral arguments on July 29,2005, in Salt Lake
City, Utah, in which the parties and counsel were all present, now enters the following:
AWARD
1. Ted Duke ("Duke") and Maria Del Carmen Zavala Cardenas ("Zavala") are expelled
as members of the Way Cool Dirt Cheap LLC ( tc WCDC) by virtue of section 48-2c710(3)(a)and(c)UCA.
2. Duke and Zavala are to become assignees as defined in section 48-2c-708 UCA with
the rights and privileges as defined in section 48-2c-l 102 UCA.
3.

Randall Graham ("R. Graham") and David Graham ("D. Graham") have failed to
sustain their burden of proof in showing that Duke and Zavala converted for their
ORDER-l

personal use and benefit the profits from the St George store and are therefore
entitled to no amount for this claim.
4. R. Graham and D. Graham's claims for the $7,019 and the $12,095 as well as other
claims for converted cash are denied as the weight of the evidence showed that Duke
and Zavala used these monies for WCDC and OWCDC operations and inventory and
not for their own personal use.
5. Duke and Zavala converted the inventory, accounts, equipment, name, good will, the
St. George store leasehold interest, trade fixtures and other assets of WCDC when
they created Original Way Cool Dirt Cheap ("OWCDC") and used those assets in the
OWCDC operations. Duke and Zavala are ordered to return the same to WCDC
forthwith as of the date of this award.
6. Duke and Zavala, by creating and operating OWCDC are in violation of paragraph
3.9 of the Operaiing Agreement. The terms of paragraph 3.9 of the Operating
Agreement are modified to reduce the geographical area of non-competition from that
of the Western United States to Utah. Duke and Zavala are restrained and prohibited
from competing with WCDC in the State of Utah for a period of two years from the
date of this Award as provided for in paragraph 3.9 of the Operating Agreement.
7. Duke7s and Zavala's claims to dissolve and distribute the assets of WCDC and
OWCDC assets are denied.
8. R. Graham and D. Graham are the prevailing parties in this action concerning their
claims for Breach of the Operating Agreement, Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary Duty
and Expulsion. They did not prevail on their claim for damages for accounting and
conversion of profits derived from the St. George store operating as either WCDC or
OWCDC, They are awarded their attorneys fees in the amount of $31.830 which
amount represents one half of the fees incurred with Woodbury & Kesler. The fees of

ORDER - 2

S8>000 for Paul Moxley and Kathryn Brabson and $900 for the firm of Barney &
2 [J

McKennna are fees that are, according to the Affidavit of Lily Graham, related to the

3

negotiation and mediation of the dispute and do not otherwise fall under paragraph

4

8.3 (d) of the Operating Agreement as attorneys fees incurred in connection with this

5

arbitration.

6
7

9. Each of the parties are to bear their own costs including the arbitrator fees paid by
each to all arbitrators that have served in this matter.
ARBITRATOR'S WRITTEN COMMENTS

8
9

At the request of the parties, I am providing the following comments in connection with

10

the Award. The comments are not to be construed or taken to be findings of fact or conclusions

31

of law. They are provided to assist the parties and their counsel to understand the reasons that

12

form the basis for the Award.

13

1. The parties entered into The Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way

14

Cool Dirt Cheap, LLC dated July 18,2003 ("Operating Agreement5') _ Exhibit C-5,

15

This Operating Agreement amended ail previous negotiations and the previous

16

Operating Agreement dated February 28, 2003 ("First Operating Agreement") -

17

Exhibit C-4.

IS
19

2. Under the terms of the Operating Agreement R. Graham was to invest and did pay
the amount of $75,000. He was not required to invest an additional $15,000.

20

3. The Operating Agreement (Exhibit C-5) and the Utah Revised Limited Liability Act

21

(section 48-2c-101 et seq. UCA) provide to rules and procedures for operating an

22

LLC. When disputes arise among the members, managers or both, there are

23

provisions that govern the resolution of those disputes. Rather than follow the rules

24

and procedures for resolving disputes under the Operating Agreement (paragraph 8)

25

or the Revise Utah LLC Act, Duke and Zavala engaged in a course of conduct of self

ORDER-3

help and self dealing that justifies their expulsion from the WCDC. To permit this
course of conduct would encourage a departure from the rule of law and would
render contract terms and the Utah Revised Limited Liability Company Act
4 11

meaningless. Among those reasons that form ihe basis for the expulsion of Duke and

5

Zavala are:

6
7

a. Failure to communicate with R. Graham and D. Graham or their designated
representatives after October, 2003.

8

b. Abusive threats and ultimatums from Duke to R. Graham.

9

c. Summarily dismissing the Staff of the St. George store and locking out R.

to
11

Graham and D. Graham.
& Diverting two truckloads of inventory paid with funds loaned by R.

12

Graham which were destined for the Draper store and causing them to be

13

delivered to the St. George store.

14
15
16
17
18

e. Failure to account for inventory or the proceeds derived from the sale of
the St George Store after January, 2004.
£ Creating a new LLC (O WCDC) with a new tax number> bank account and
converting the assets of WCDC for its operations and benefit
g. Creating a competing business using the name, good will, lease, inventory,

19

equipment, trade fixtures, and connections with the Mexico operations to

20

compete with WCDC.

21

22

h. Failure to account for the revenues and costs of operation of the St
George Store of WCDC or OWCDC.

23

i- Failure to take meaningful steps to participate in good faith in the dispute

24

resolution procedures set out in paragraph 8 of the Operating Agreement

25
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In stead of so participating. Duke and Zavala created the OCWDC entity
and converted the assets of WCDC to in order to operate OWCDC.
The aforementioned actions and omissions constitute a breach of fiduciary duty under
paragraph 3.8 of the Operating Agreement and also creates a violation of section 482c-710 (3) (a) and (c) UCA wherein said activities have "adversely and materially
affected the company's business" and "makes it not reasonably practicable to carry
on the business with the member."
Duke and Zavala have provided evidence of R. Graham's misconduct which in the
view of the" arbitrator does not constitute a violation of paragraph 3.8 of the Operating
Agreement or section 48-2c-710 (3) (a) and (c). There was no requirement under the
Operating Agreement for R. Graham to invest an additional $15,000. Duke and
Zavala cite dissatisfaction with R. Graham in the way he handled the selection of the
Draper Store site and the construction of the tenant improvements. Duke and Zavala
also had differences of opinion with R. Graham concerning the need for cash with
which to purchase inventory. R. Graham was not required to loan or invest additional
cash into the business although the evidence establishes that substantial loans and
advances were provided due to the lack of cash flow caused by the slow construction
and inability to immediately money earmarked for tenant improvements to purchase
inventory. Duke and Zavala also complain about the competence of R. Graham and
people he hired to set up and operate both the Draper and St George Stores. The
arbitrator finds that R. Graham may have committed errors in judgment in connection
with these matters, but always acted in good faith and in a manner he "believed to be
within the scope of his authority and in the best interest of the Company..." (See
paragraph 3.8 of the Operating Agreement).
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6. With the expulsion of Duke and Zavala form WCDC it is the mtent of the arbitrator
to designate them as assignees as provided for in section 48-2c-708 UCA with the
rights and privileges as defined in section 48-2c-l 102 UCA.
7. Also, with the expulsion of Duke and Zavala, all assets of WCDC and OWCDC are
to be placed in control of R Graham and D. Graham, the two remaining members and
R. Gragam as the remaining manager. These assets are to include but not be limited
to accounts, inventory, equipment, furniture, leaseholds, trade fixtures, the name, and
good will as of the date of this award.
8. Paragraph 3.9 is the non-compete clause in the Operating Agreement It is too broad
in its application as to the Western United Stales. WCD maintains stores in Utah
only and the non-compete clause is hereby restricted to the geographical boundaries
of Utah. All of the other terms of the non-compete clause are to remain in full force.
9. Concerning R.Graham's and D. Graham's claims against Duke and Zavala for failure
to account for lost profits: Although there is evidence that the St George store has
realized profits (Exhibits C-10 and C-l 1) there is no evidence as TO what happened to
those profits. There was no evidence showing that monies were diverted to accounts
other than the WCDC or OWCDC accounts. There was no evidence that Duke or
Zavala took monies from the sale of WCDC or OWCDC inventory and used them for
their personal oi separate business purposed. For example, the ATM withdrawals
and checks in summarized in Exhibit 2 pp. 10-11 were used to pay the costs of
operating the business and the $7,019 withdrawn from the WCDC account in placed
in Duke's personal account was used to purchase inventory for either WCDC or
OWCDC. The testimony of Lily Graham, Craig Ainge and Jamie Clawson did not
reveal any improprieties. There was a lot of disagreement over what store had what
level of inventory, but never a showing that inventory, revenues or profits had been

ORDER-6

taken or converted by Duke or Zavala. Also, Craig Ainge testified of discrepancies
between sales and deposits but could not make a connection or establish that Duke or
Zavala converted the differences in amounts to their personal use. The burden of
proof as to the lost profits claims is on the Claimants who, in the opinion of the
arbitrator, did not meet their burden with the accounting testimony furnished by Craig
Ainge, Jamie Clawson or Lily Graham.
lOIn addition to the initial investment of $75,000 by R. Graham and $60,000 by D.
Graham (the only cash invested in WCDC) R. Graham provided for additional capital
and security at his personal expense which was used to purchase inventory and pay
the operating expenses of WCDC. Among the financial contributions R. Graham
provided the following:
a. Guaranty of the five year Draper lease at a cost of approximately $14,000
per month - which obligation included the balance of the tenant
improvement money ($102,000) that was used to pay for company
expenses and inventory.
b. $47,000 personal loan December 3,2003 used for inventory, shipping and
general company expenses.
c. Line of credit for $100,000 established in May, 2004 secured by a lien on
the R. Graham home.
d. $75,000 Joe Groot loan
e. $75,000 Leo Pavich loan
f. $50,000 family loan to R. Graham used for company expenses
g. $10,000 Washington Mutual loan used for company expenses
h. undetermined - personal and RDG credit cards
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11. In addition to the capital R. Graham infused into WCDC he accrued salary of

2

$60,098 and his wife, Lily, accrued salary of SI 8,000. D. Graham accrued salary of

3

$36,000.

4
5

CONCLUSION
The arbitrator confirms that this Award is a complete disposition of all the issues

6

submitted to him under the terms of the Amended and Restated Operating Agreement of Way

7

Cool Dirt Cheap dated July 18, 2003 ("Operating Agreement"), and the Order of Hon. Bruce C.

S

Lubeck, District Court Judge, of February 23,2005, evidence and legal arguments on which

9

issues was presented at'the hearings held in Salt Lake City, Utah on June 13 & 14, 200:5; July 21,

10

22,23,24,2005; and July 29,2005.

11
12
13

DATED

0 //-/

/(/?

/ / -p™

St**^

Kent B. Scott, Arbitrator
14
15

16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24

25
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ADDENDUM EXHIBIT 4

TED DUKE, ET AL,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
VS
RANDAL GRAHAM,
Defendant-Appellee.
DECEMBER 30, 2005
INDEX
DISTRICT COURT NO. 040925274
SUPREME COURT NO. 20051036-SC
DATE
FILED
12-07-05
12-07-05
12-13-05
12-22-05
12-07-05

EXHIBITS

DOCUMENT
COPY OF COVER PAGE OF TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS
ON 02-22-05, 08-17-05, 08-24-05, 09-13-05,10-14-05
NOTICE OF FILING TRANSCRIPT
ORDER DIRECTING OFFICER TO DELIVER PROPERTY
APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF EXECUTION
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS ON 02-22-05,08-17-05,
08-24-05,09-13-05,10-14-05

PAGE
NUMBERS
364
365
366-367
368-370
371

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA
DEL CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 040925274

vs.
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual;
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual; and
CRAIG R. MARIGER, in his capacity as
purported arbitrator herein,
Defendants.

TRANSCRIPT OF HEARINGS

February 22, 2005
August 17, 2005
August 24, 2005
September 13, 2005
October 14, 2005

FILED DISTRICT COURT

Third Judicial District

DEC - 7 2005
SALT LAKE COUNTY

ByJ
Deputy Clerk

BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN PAUL KENNEDY
District Court Judge

jeri Kearbey
Certified Court Transcriber
irjo Gaylene Circle
Sandy, Utah 84094
ACACi

-£(/4

TO:

The Utah Supreme Court
SCOTT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attention: Pat Bartholomew
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TED DUKE, an individual; and MARIA
DEL CARMEN SAVALA CARDENAS,
an individual,
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 20051036-SC

vs.
RANDALL GRAHAM, an individual;
DAVID GRAHAM, an individual; and
CRAIG R. MARIGER, in his capacity as
purported arbitrator herein,
Defendants.

Notice is hereby given that on the 6th day of December 2005, a transcript of proceedings held
before The Honorable John Paul Kennedy, District Court Judge, on February 22; August 17; August 24;
September 13 and October 14, 2005 in the above case were completed and delivered to the managing reporter
at the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DATED this 6th day of December 2005.

LJ§ri Keaitfey
Certified Court Transcriber
566-4540

cc:

Nick J. Colessides, Attorney
David R. Williams, W&K
Clerk of the Court

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEC - 7 2005
SALT LAKE COUNTY

By. &

Deputy Clerk
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH; FRIDAY, OCTOBER 1 4 ,

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. COLESSIDES:

5

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, sir.

Apparently, we had a matter scheduled

that didn't get on our calendar today.

7

delay.

10
11

P.M.

Good afternoon.

6

9

2:05

-oooOooo-

2

8

2005,

We apologize for the

Counsel, do you want to state your appearances?
MR. COLESSIDES:

Nick J. Colessides appearing on

behalf of the plaintiffs, Your Honor.
MR. WILLIAMS:

David Williams appearing on behalf

of the defendant, Your Honor.

12

THE COURT:

13

that are, apparently, pending.

14

confirming the arbitration award, and we have also, as I see

15

the file, a motion by the plaintiffs to vacate the

16

arbitrator's award.

17

Okay.

18

consider today?

19
20
21

Okay.

We have a couple of matters
One f s a proposed order

That was filed back in August.

Are there other matters that are — to

MR. COLESSIDES:

Your Honor, yes.

There f s a

couple of matter.
Insofar as — and the minor item is something we

22

agreed upon between Mr. Williams and myself.

As it relates

23

to the truck which was already returned to the credit union,

24

we made the agreement that Mr. Duke may take — because

25

there's no equity in the truck, Your Honor — may take the
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1 authority.
THE COURT:

2

So your position is, even if

3 Arbitrator Scott made a mistake as to the law, that doesn't
4 matter.
5

MR. WILLIAMS:

6

THE COURT:

That's right.

And that, as long as the question of

7 law was before him properly under the award, whether he
8 decided correctly or not, it doesn't make any difference.
MR. WILLIAMS:

9

That's right.

The court bias to

10 confirm his award if it was within the scope of his
11 authority.
12

THE COURT:

Mr. Colessides says there was a

13 mistake as to law because he's telling him — he's saying, in
14 essence, that the arbitrator can replace a manager here.
15 So, first of all, let's deal with that question.

Did the

16 arbitrator replace the manager?
17

MR. WILLIAMS:

18

THE COURT:

No.

Okay.

So your position is, even if

19 Mr. Colessides is correct, that the arbitrator can be — his
20 award can be vacated if he makes a mistake of law, he didn't
21 make a mistake of law anyway because he didn't replace the
22 manager.

Okay.

23

MR. WILLIAMS:

24

THE COURT:

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

What he did was expel the members.

Okay.

Can you do that under the law?

You can.

What the statute says is
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1

MR. COLESSIDES:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. COLESSIDES:

Yes.

May I, Your Honor?

Go ahead.
On the first issue that the Court

4

inquired, Your Honor, the arbitrator exceeds his authority

5

by acting in manifest disregard of the law.

6

in the state of Utah, and we have it in our brief, Your

7

Honor.

8
9

That's a case

And what we're suggesting to the Court at this
time, Your Honor, is that, as one looks at the award — and

10

the award is very specific.

11

it does, it says that it expels Mr. Duke and Mr. — and

12

Ms. Cardenas as members, number one.

13

as a manager.

14

It only has 16 lines.

And what

And it expels Mr. Duke

We respectfully suggest to the Court that the law

15

of the state of Utah is that you cannot either expel a

16

member or expel a manager of a limited liability company

17

except by judicial proceedings.

18

court — the statute itself says that the district court

19

clerk shall take the necessary — once the court finds that

20

an expulsion is proper, the district court clerk shall

21

notify the director of corporations of the State of Utah to

22

show that that person has been expelled as a — as a member

23

or a manager.

24
25

And, specifically, the

This is what we call, Your Honor, that the
arbitrator exceeded his authority manifestly, because he's
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MR. COLESSIDES:
THE] COURT:

2001.

And the section dealing with vacating

the award was last changed May 15th, 2003.

So, it would

seem to me that, if that's true, that — you know, the
legislature obviously could have changed that.

They could

have stuck in some language that would have modified it or,
you know, qualified it some way.

They didn't do that.

If

there's a — if there's a technical problem regarding
notifying the State — or the corporations department, I
would assume that, when the — when the order is confirmed by
the Court, which is the prerogative of either party to the
arbitration award, I assume, then if it's necessary to
notify the State at that point, they can be notified.
And, in that sense, I suppose it is even qualified
as a judicial determination.

But I don't see — I don't see

this as exceeding the arbitrator's award.

And if that's the

only issue that we're talking about, I would — I would find
that, as a matter of law, that that does not exceed the
arbitrator's authority.
Do you have — is there another point where you
think —
MR. COLESSIDES:

The only point I'm making, Your

Honor, is I don't quite know if that specific version of
the — the specific portion of the Act, Exceeding Authority,
is not — does not — precedes 2001 and may go back to 1990.

187

I don't know which part or which language was changed, Your
Honor.
THE COURT:

I don't think it's necessary to even

focus that specifically on line by line.

It just — these

two sections were both reviewed at those times, and I think
the legislature, if they wanted to change it, they could
have changed it.

And so the one that's in effect at the

latest date is the one that gives the broadest authority, I
think, to the arbitrator.

And, certainly, I think the

purpose of the arbitration code is — that portion of the
code is — dealing with arbitration is to relieve burdens
from the court, to provide alternative ways of resolving
disputes.

And to interfere with the arbitrator's authority,

I think, would undermine the whole purpose of that.

And

rather than make it a facilitating provision, it would
become even worse, more complicated in the end, I think.
So, again, I would — I would find and rule as a
matter of law that — that, in this instance, with respect to
the removal of members or managers, that the arbitrator did
not exceed his authority, that that was within his
authority.
I don't — I would find, further, that it's not a
manifest violation of the law, because of what I've said
about the timing of the law.
It may also not be a manifest violation of the law
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1 judgment as well as attaching it as an exhibit, just so that
2 I would be sure to comply with that rule.
3

THE COURT:

So you•re -not adopting by reference,

4 you're just repeating verbatim everything in the award.
5

MR.. WILLIAMS:

6

THE COURT:

Yeah.

So your representation to me and to

7 Mr. Colessides is that, other than misspelling "judgment,"
8 you have copied everything verbatim, including nothing more,
9 and leaving out nothing, than is set forth in the award,
10 other than the beginning statements and the concluding
11 signatures.
12

MR. WILLIAMS:

Yes, Your Honor.

13 oh, there is one — there is one change.
14

THE COURT:

15

MR. WILLIAMS:

16

"Arbitrator's Written Comments."

There may be —
On page 4 —

All right.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. WILLIAMS:

— right under where it says

Uh-huh.
"At the request of the parties, the

19 arbitrator is..."
20

THE COURT:

Uh-huh.

21

MR. WILLIAMS:

I inserted that language because he

22 used — I think he named himself or "I am."

He said, "At the

23 request of the parties, I am providing,.."
24

THE COURT:

25

MR. WILLIAMS:

Okay.

So —

And just by bracket, I said the
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1

arbitrator is rather than saying "I am."

2

THE COURT:

All right.

Okay.

Well, it would

3

appear to me that this is in order.

I don't know that it

4

does anything different from signing the confirmation order

5

that I've signed.

6

Mr. Colessides wants to state some other substantive

7

objection.

So I'm going to go ahead, unless

8

MR. COLESSIDES:

9

Your Honor, to review it.

I have not had an opportunity,
I just looked at it as it was

10 given to me.
H

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm going to sign it.

12

I 1 11 give you — if you need 30 days to — if you want to

13

raise an objection, I'll be happy to let you do it.

14

MR. COLESSIDES:

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you, Your Honor.
Okay.

Again, I want to

16

compliment counsel on both sides.

17

a superb job in trying to educate the Court and brief this

18

matter.

19

been vigorous and has been thorough.

20

you on that.

21

thorough job.

22

I think you've both done

I think your representation of your clients has
I compliment both of

I wish everybody who came in did such a

Obviously, in these cases, one side prevails and

23

one side doesn't prevail.

In this case, it would appear to

24

the Court that the defendants have prevailed and they would

25

be entitled to your relief under that — under that
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1

conclusion.

2

I would just reiterate what I said.

3

arbitrated personally over the years, as an advocate, maybe

4 I 150 arbitration cases.
5

I think I've

on a number of cases.

I have served as an arbitrator also

And I feel that it is a — it is a

6 I good system, but one of the reasons it's good is because the
7

award of the arbitrator has such a potential finality.

8

in this instance, it's obvious that the plaintiffs don't

And

9 I agree with what the arbitrator did and, you know, that's
10

their prerogative.

But that doesn't mean that it shouldn't

11

be enforced under the law.
So, again, thank you.

12

13 (you've done.

I compliment you on what

And, unless there's something further, we'll

14 be in recess,
15

J

MR. COLESSIDES:

Thank you, Your Honor.

16

MR. WILLIAMS:

17 I

(Whereupon, at the hour of 3:06 p.m.,

18
19 J

Thank you, Your Honor.

the hearing was concluded.)
-oooOooo-

20
21
22
23
24
25
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